IRAN109 - Future of KIRI

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IRAN109 - Future of KIRI

Postby Admzad » Thu Dec 23, 2004 7:58 pm

IRAN109 - Future of KIRI

The Masters put Khomeini's IRI there (see http://www.freeamerica.com/world/world2.html) & they
can't afford to remove it yet coz:

a-It's too good for them
a1-totally in their hands
b2-they have made a fortune so far & there is still money to be made

b-The whole country would be blown to pieces with the hate/division that exists among Iranians

c-with all the money IRI has given to many terrorist orgs & all the 'hate' they have shown towards
the 'west' in the last 23 years, with the thousands of their own people being butchered & tortured,
how come all of a sudden they r part of the 'good-guys' team? It must all have been part of the
scenario/game, & still is, riqt?



It could happen if:

1-75% of Iranians unite & come-UP with a civil system, before taking over(!), that could do a
win-win deal with the Masters. But for Masters to do this, some pressure must be placed on them so that
it won't look good to have KhIRI there no more.


But if they haven't done this in 23 niqtmarish years, y now?
I mean u name it & they have had:
-War
-Torture/killing by the thousands
-Drugs & Prostitution
-Massive corruption
-Massive unemployment
-Massive poverty
-Savage laws of stoning/hanging/butchering
-Massive damage to 'religion'


This is one reason I think a constitutional-Monarchy would be an easier/faster way of getting out of
this mess in the short run:
-It's been proven before & the foundation is there
-The constitution is there & only needs some modification(if any?)
-it could unite people if freedom is given to many parties to get into Majles
(but still there would be problems with EGO & urge-to-dominate others (from all involved or not) )
-Masters have seen it before

Any other system would need more work & too much inner fiqting/debates, unless the Masters come
up with something different, bless their kind hearts.



2-Oil runs out & not much money left to be made, so the Masters would just back-off?

On second thouqt, I don't think so coz if they let go, the mess in Iran (due to internal
fiqting) would mess up the neiqbours & cause problems for the Masters' interests in the region.


3- What if the good-Mullahs decide to save Islam & turn against the bad-Mullahs?

But the good Mullahs know they can't 'govern' & would need politicians/experts to run the show.
So they have to team up with another group. But this has to have the blessing of the Masters, or
it won't happen.

Since even KhoSHEMRi used to believe in Monarchy, it's very likely that most of the good Mullahs be
pro-Monarchy, specially having seen the divisions & inner-fiqting of Iranians in the last 23 years.

If the good Mullahs don't rise against the bad-Mullahs/IRI, they would pay a very heavy price when
IRI goes, which will have to happen sooner or later. But Shi'eh Islam in Iran will never recover from
this, unless the Masters force most Iranians to be illiterate & ignorant by forcing another form of
corrupt dictatorship into power, which is not too Islamic & forces Islam to go underground.



Are countries very different to companies?
I mean if a company is not managed well, it will go bust or will be taken over by another Co, no?

I doubt very much if there would be as many countries in 2300, than there r now.

But people do deserve their Governments.

Damet Garm, sakht nagir baabaa, Bi Khiyaal ...


-------------------------------------------------------

The 1st thing KhoSHEMRI did was to order the execution of the officer who arrested him many years
ago. The officer was seen hung with his balls stuck in his mouth.
To me this said it all WHAT(not who!) this jerk was.

Yet when u read Shah's book, he doesn't even use one swear word against the holy-Jerk & calls him
the old-man/piremard. This too tells me who Shah was/IS. He was one of the very few(if not the only one),
who knew WHO was behind the 78-79 events: THE MASTERS. I don't think a cruel dictator would've left
quietly without a major bloodshed.

Interesting that in this:
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~mideast/iohp/zarqamee6.html
Shah is shown as a caring/reasonable leader, yet one of the ministers was a power hungry dictator.

In a culture as messy & as EGO/Bully/Qoldor parast as Iran, u can't put somebody on top & expect him
to fix everything & run everything.

Shah was an "Iranian" & like most Iranians was not perfect. He didn't ask to be a king, it just happened
that way & he was very young when he was pushed into it.

Many Iranians were against him (many were paid to do so) Some tried to kill him. Few enemies paid a lot of
money to get few parties going in Iran against him. So there was a need for a Secret/intelligence-service.
Many blame Shah for Savak being too cruel, but I think CIA/KGB have done far worst things. Even Mullahs have
been worst. Many Zhaandarm/Paasebun were very cruel too. But some people r still stuck on Shah, Y? Coz they
feel guilty, that's y. They want an escape goat. Also, they feel 'important' bashing the 'Palang'. Well y
don't they bash the Monster that has been killing Iranians by the thousands & has been destroying Iran
instead? Coz they don't have the guts, they've bent over for the Monsters for 23 God damned years & have
done nothing but bash the Shah!

They say he was a playboy. I've known many young Iranian men who didn't have even half the resources
Shah had, yet they were far worst than Shah was in being a playboy.

So much chaos & ignorance & corruption & savage-brutality in the culture, yet many expect Shah not only to
have been perfect, but be responsible for the bad behavior of others & the whole country running perfectly
as if nobody else had any responsibility at all?!

No, I think some people are blaming Shah to justify what they did in the BIG-Revulsion. Yes they had to
do it, coz Shah was bad! What an X-cuse! U r all responsible for this tragedy!



Parts of zarqamee's interview:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, Abdol Hossein Samii had become Minister of Hiqer Education, and he was under the
impression that there should be a kingdom called Hiqer Education. And he the king, the throned
king of the Hiqer Education system.


The student who is shouting and screaming, when you really sat down and talked to him, it wasn't political.
He even hadn't matured to have political opposition at the time. The government really didn't have any
avenue open at the time for some sort of .... If a problem existed, throuq those avenues it would be resolved.


Q. Riqt. OK. Now, were decisions made in your presence by the Shah? This is what I was going to ask you.
You said later on some of the ideas you had never got .... I mean, he would say, "All riqt ...."
A. No. No decision was made. What I saw was a very democratic Shah. He never made a decision for the
government; he always said, "I will recommend ...." -- "Man tosriyeh mikonam" -- I will recommend to
the government to provide the necessary funds." Or: "Go and talk to the Prime Minister." If he had to
make a decision himself, he would definitely say, "Write me." So I would have written him. And then the
government was given an opportunity to respond. I had one audience with him after I became the Managing
Director of Copper, at which time I talked about the railroad, and I talked about molybdenum and copper,
and the schedule, and this sort of thing. But that was no argument even, it was just factual -- reporting
of the progress. But at the university, every time our argument was factual -- I mean, was non-factual.


Q. You said that you found a "democratic Shah," yet when you would write him and he would send your
recommendations to the Prime Minister or other officials ....
A. They ignored it, apparently. It wasn't ....
Q. Why didn't they follow the Shah's orders?
A. I don't think that they felt that they had to. There was .... I never saw a Shah that was ....
This is .... What I am talking about is limited exposure. A Shah that was portrayed, especially
after the revolution -- or even in the media before the revolution. He could have told me: "No! You
have build that university such and such! You have to do this! You have to get those students this or
that!" He was always arguing. I remember this argument that we had about the existence of guards in
the university. He said, "You are coming .... I mean, you did most of your education in America.
Haven't you seen in America the University Police is walking with a gun that big? We are even not
letting these people carry guns!" I said, "Well, this is the society. I mean, the environment is
different." But we had that argument with him. And he finally said, "OK. You go ahead and do what
you want to do."


... And somehow, somebody went to His Majesty and said that this center should become independent.
And the Shah sent a letter with a recommendation: see what you have to do.

And I wrote back, and I gave the explanation that this is not wise. I said in a university that research
... if research is cut away from teaching, it loses .... in a developing country, it loses its meaningful
existence. ... It's the future implication of them. And the Shah immediately bouqt it. He sent a letter
to the minister and said, "This is the riqt way of doing things."

Q. The way that you had suggested?
A. Yes.
Q. And was it followed?
A. Yes. The whole idea was dropped.



Q. Would you say that the students from the provinces were more politically active than students from Tehran?

A. Yes. Yes. It was the activism .... The students .... If I categorize the students into four categories,
and the four categories are in accordance to whether they are socially or psychologically alienated or not....
So, there would be one group that's neither psychologically nor socially alienated. And one group that would
be either psychologically or socially, and one group that would be neither/nor {rather, "both" -- ed.}.
Anyway, you see what I am talking about.

Most of the students from Tehran fitted in a category that I would consider CrarelyD psychologically alienated.
They may have social alienation, but they were of the type that would come and sit with you and talk, and say,
"Hey, this country is worthless!" And I would say, "Why?" And he would say, "There's suppression, this...." He
would not hesitate to talk to you, and to express his opinion. He would have a leadership. The people who were
coming from the villages, they had psychological alienation. The source of the psychological alienation was,
I think, a value-system problem, or whatever. And the psychological alienation either resulted in somebody who
was also socially alienated, and sort of he would be a withdrawn person. Otherwise, they would be people who
would become terrorists.

And these people, who were psychologically alienated and socially alienated, they became .... they coalesced
with those who were just socially alienated, which expanded rapidly in 1979, and sort of comprised the entire
country. But after the revolution, those who were psychologically alienated actually destroyed the socially
alienated and psychologically OK people. It's amazing, but at that time, my interest was really to find these
psychologically alienated people and try to do something for them. It wasn't the socially alienated. I mean,
most of my students were socially alienated. And also the faculty was socially alienated. That was ... Social
alienation was not a problem in Iran.



Q. As of when did you sense that anti-regime sentiments were developing among the students?

A. Anti-regime sentiments were always there. It was a part of .... The same guy who would oppose the
Shah on religious grounds, I know that on graduation he would have a glass of whiskey in his hand, and
a blonde or brunette or something next to him. I mean, come on, it was a way of life. In Iran, everybody
was anti-regime. Including the Prime Minister himself. They would sit down and criticize -- whenever they
had a whiskey in their hand, they would criticize.

Q. Were you ever in any of their sessions?

A. Oh, many people used to criticize. Come on! Half of the guys here, who are now against Khomeini, they were
-- at one time, they said, "Oh, that's nice, to have the revolution." I'll never forget, I was once sitting
somewhere, relatively recently, and I asked -- this was riqt immediately after the revolution -- and many
people were glad. And when I asked, "What do you think was the cause of the revolution?" And they came out
with such stupid remarks. I mean, I can't imagine. The guy who was, for example, in a department of Tehran
University, and another fellow in the same department happened to become a minister. Now, that was the cause
of the revolution. Because they didn't come and give a position to this guy also. I mean, that was .... Come
on, .... There was a study made in 1970 -- I've got this paper. Somebody from here came and actually measured
an index of cynicism. And that was CsoD hiq. I mean, you ... the people who were really the foundations of
the regime were criticizing. Not because they were opposed to the government. They had ... everything they had
was from the government -- that's why when the revolution came, everybody was in the boat. You didn't have
anybody standing on the other side, next to the Shah. The Shah was left alone. All these people who really fed
up to here from the Shah's regime, they became opposed. "Oh yes, we opposed these sons of bitches for a long
time. We have been criticizing."

Q. So, ever since you remember, the students were anti-regime?

A. They were anti-regime in a sense, but it would fade out. The same guy who was anti-regime, .... In 1950
<1350>, there was a guy called Ashja', a student. He -- now, I'm not sure, either 1950 <1350> or 1949 <1349>
-- was condemned to life imprisonment. And he had friends who later on either were killed or were something,
or they became terrorists. The Shah came to the university. They were killing themselves to go next to the
Shah and take a picture! The Shah went riqt in the middle of the graduating class. That's .... The opposition
to the Shah was symbolic of an age, and we accepted that in the university. The same guys would find employment,
and.... Come on, look at the ministers! The ministers of Iran were all student leaders.

Q. That's riqt. {unclear} you were saying that they didn't change their minds so much about being opposed to
the Shah's policies. I get the impression...

A. Oh, it was ... you are saying that whether it was founded, the opposition to the Shah ...?

Q. Well ....

---I find the following very interesting: Palang-factor! ADMZAD---

A. The opposition to the Shah primarily had one or two roots, always. One was just suppression, political
suppression. I mean, this was a guy to ..... If you wanted to shout -- and sometimes you want to shout in
the middle of -- I mean, I want to shout in the middle of the street. So, the only one you could curse was
the Shah. That was the hiqest authority you could curse, anyway. So the students were opposed to the Shah
because of the political structure of the country and because of corruption. These were the two main themes.
Beyond that, the criticism that they were saying, really, they didn't have enouq information, for example,
to criticize the educational system. You never had ... exposed the masses to the intricacies and problems of
the educational system.


---a Dictator wouldn't remove censorship?! ADMZAD ---

A. Sorry -- that would be 1970. They said, "We want to publish a journal." A few months before that, we were at
<a Court ceremony>, and the Shah said, "I have come to believe that one of the things that is holding back
this country is censorship. And now that we are embarking on a path of industrialization, etc., we have to
develop the people. And we have to stop censoring." And he came to the university the same year, Aban Azar Day.
He said, "Isn't that funny, that this university a few days ago had unrest, and the subject was opposition to
the increase in the price of busses. And a few panes of glass were broken. Now, do you really expect that if
you put a few thousand students in a university, and you suffocate them, and don't let them express their
opposition to an increase in the price of the busses?" I mean, he accepted in that statement ....

That statement is classical. In the same discussion that the Shah had with the students, he spoke for an hour and
a half, without even knowing that he was going to talk. Of course, he said, "We are negotiating to establish OPEC
and increase .... get our share of the oil." But at that time he said that there is nothing wrong with student
activism, and the doors of censorship should open. So the kids came to me and said that they want to open the
doors. I said, "Yes, go ahead." So I went to the chancellor. I was at that time <Ma'aven-e Daneshkadeh-e Riyazi>,
vice-chairman of the Math Department. So I went to the chancellor, and I said, "The students want to write."
He said, "Let them write. But tell them ...." That was the impression he got from the Shah. "But tell them they
have to find a faculty {member?}, and work under that faculty {member?}. So I told the students. They said,
"What about you?" I said, "No, no, no, I am busy up to here.




A. ... a number of occasions in which the oppositions fouqt, and fouqt harshly. In fact, I remember that
Sharif was a student who -- of Aryamehr University -- and he was a member of Mojahedin, he was very much
religious, and he opposed the creeping ... communist idea in the Mojahedin organization, and he was eventually
murdered by Mojahedin.

Q. Really?

A. Another student was pushed from the fourth floor of the dormitory of Aryamehr University. He smashed his
head on the asphalt and was killed.

Q. Who pushed him?

A. It was never known, althouq there were students around. They even never cooperated to the extent of finding
who did it. But it was definitely -- this incident, like the killing of Sharif -- was politically motivated.

Q. When you say Mojahedin murdered him -- how did they do that? How did they murder him?

A. Well, they took him .... Sharif was taken ... well, there was a guy, another student, called Shahram ...
He wasn't ... I don't believe he was a student of ... Shahram was his last name. Shahram was not a student
of Aryamehr University, and he was pushing for Marxist ideology.

And Sharif was a student of Aryamehr University, and he opposed the creeping Marxism, because .... and also the
decision that was being made at that time by Mojaheddin to abandon the Islamic foundation part and go...more and
more lean toward Marxism because they somehow felt the danger of leaning too much toward Islam -- the danger that
finally happened to them. I mean, the thing would fall ultimately in the hands of mullahs -- or extremists,
Islamic extremists.




Q. Could you describe some of these individuals? I mean, {unclear}

A. By and large they were not outspoken. The ones that .... I am specifically referring to the terrorist
members of the Mojahedin or Fada'iyan.

First of all, Aryamehr University didn't have ... I don't think that they had a lot of members of the Fada'iyan
organization. Whatever ... Whoever I knew there were belonging to the Mojahedin organization. By and large, ...
they were ... introvert ... they did not mingle well with other students, even. They rarely attended class, at
least toward the end of the time of their capture. I mean, Oloumi's first year maybe he was a OK student, but
later on he became ... you felt a depression in their ..., or a depression feeling in their attitudes.

They were very much eager to pass the courses, so they came toward the end of the course, and they wanted to get
a grade, and take the exams, and this sort of thing. And I had the policy that I wanted to see the student all
throuq the year, and usually I ended up talking to these people: "Where were you? Why didn't you take the interim
exams? Where are your homeworks?" And this sort of thing. And he would answer in a confused, lost way that you
would know that here we go again.

And ... Somebody from Berkeley made a -- this was be during the late 1960s-early 1970s -- made a distinction
between two groups of ... between various students by dividing them according to whether they had psychological
or social alienation. By psychological alienation, he means somebody who is not ... who has feelings of loneliness,
of inability, powerlessness, etc, etc. By social alienation, he means somebody who doesn't agree with the trends,
pace, or direction that the society is developing.

A number of students were socially alienated, and they used to sit down and talk and discuss, and they wanted to
actively participate in everything, and they wanted to improve the society. You would see them as they spoke. They
were against the government, or against the direction that the country was going. But at their heart there was an
idea for development.

There were other students who were psychologically alienated. They were either withdrawn from the society, or they
were terrorists when they became extremely socially alienated as well. It was probably a result of their upbringing,
or because of the shattering of their value-system in the rapidly-developing society of Iran.

What was happening in Iran was this: that the entire value-systems of the students, especially those that came from
the more remote places, were being changed.... And a kid who had come from a small town, and had sort of a religious
upbringing ... and came necessarily from a poor family, he saw the lavish {\sic\} of the Tehran, and he saw all the
corruption. And he saw even girls and boys going out on dates. He couldn't digest that. And he definitely felt there
was something wrong with him. He couldn't possibly mix with this society. Where are the principles? And he was ....
He -- at the same time he was being attracted to these, and he had to resist. And there was this tremendous fiqt
within his inner system.

Now, add to that some social alienation -- a lot of social alienation -- and you would have your terrorist. And
they were very withdrawn. They did not talk even to their fellow students, etc, etc. At the same time I can also
see that they had much hiqer things in mind .... They knew that they were going to lose their lives on that. I
mean, that's a big decision, and I can see why you would get depressed, or....

Now which one came first? Was there social and psychological alienation that led into terrorists, or was it really
getting into terrorism, and then by nature you become psychologically and socially alienated, I don't know. But what
I saw was a manifestation, that was clear to me, of social and psychological alienation simultaneously.

But, by and large, the students who had social alienation, they developed into ordinary ... people in Iran. I mean,
they would criticise, etc, and then they graduate and find a job in Plan Organization, this place, this company, that
company.... And they would lead a normal life. The people who had extreme psychological alienation, you would know
something is going to go wrong.




A. 1974. The population of engineers in Iran underwent a significant change. In 1968 -- or 66 actually -- there
were only 11,000 engineers in the entire country. This is all areas. If the revolution had not taken place, and all
the engineers that we had generated would remain in the country with the same pace, we would have close to 70,000
to 100,000 engineers now. But even in 1974, it had increased to around 20,000, or something like that. The engineers
were not that many.

---But now we have more Mullahs that we've ever had ?! ADMZAD---


Q. What, if anything, did you and your friends try to do to prevent the collapse of the regime?
A. First you have to recognize that we didn't know the regime was collapsing.

If you look at it from two points of view .... From the point of view of ... that whatever was happening --
revolution, as the Shah called it even -- was going to create an environment of democratization in Iran, we
weren't opposed to that. I mean, we liked it. And if the revolution was supposed to be a mechanism for realization
of this level of democratization, fine -- there was nothing wrong with it.

If the revolution was the collapse of the regime, well, we didn't really recognize that the regime was collapsing
until very late. And ... well, not much could have been done at that time. We were trying to only make a ... the
transition from ... transition smoothly. That's I think what concerned most people. And the transition was really ....

I was primarily concerned about the lives and safety of so many expatriates that we had. Not only regular expatriates
from, say, South Africa or America. One of them, an American, was killed in Kerman during the revolution, who was an
agent of the construction firm for local purchases in Kerman. He was murdered by the revolutionaries. His throat was
cut by glass -- rubbing against glass. He was one of the two Americans who died in the revolution in Iran.




The revolution was ... took place with a lot of order. And I knew that .... I mean, I wasn't feeling concerned
about myself at all. In fact, I was shocked when I was ... when I went back to the university, and one of the
students said that "We want to take you to jail!" I went to the jail, and I talked to the person, and I wanted to
leave. Because they took me to ... so that they examine the papers and see whether they need me or not, they want
me to stay or not. But I told the guy, "I have a four o'clock appointment, and I have to leave."

I never considered that I would be of the kind that would be kept there. For four and a half months. But they had ...
well, I didn't have all the information.

Q. The next questions have to do with the period when you were in jail. If you would like, this is ...
please describe the circumstances under which you were arrested and imprisoned.

A. I went to the university. One of the students came to me -- probably he was intrigued by one of the faculty
members from that union I was talking about -- and, very politely, asked me to follow him. I went to the guards'
building -- the university guards' building. He had a machine-gun with him, but it was under his .... Many students
were carrying a machine-gun at that time, because they ..... I mean, all these machine-guns were released, and many
of these students participated in the orgy.

---Yes the orgy of POWER in the name of freedom/aazaadi ?!
All got sucked-in to destroy their own country! ADMZAD---




And then they asked me about specific documents. They didn't know much about the organization set-up in Iran,
because they were asking a lot of dumb questions. Anyway, and then I ...

Finally I told them that:"Hey! I have devoted all my life in education, and I believe in education. I have built
a university. And ... I believe that the only way to the prosperity of the future of Iran is in educating the youth
of the country." And he said that, "Well, you're a reformist, and we are a revolutionary, and our two paths are
different."



He said, he turned around and asked the guy, "Is there any complaint?" He said, "No." I said, "Well, I have been
at the university, if there is any complaint, you can ask the students." Because there were a number of students
who were working, especially the Mojahedin group, who were working in the prison. Apparently the prison was held
in the hands of Mojahedin, at least the administration part. Or people who were pro-Mojahedin, maybe because of
more religious inclinations that they had.


---And now the real heroes come in: mardome sharif va baa Khoda va mehmaan-navaazeh Iran! ADMZAD ---

Q. How was life in prison? {unclear}

A. Well, life in prison started .... At the beginning it was very hard. There were about 40 students of Tehran
University who were pro-Shah, and they were all arrested for gathering and ... under the title of "Mashrouteh",
"Constitutionalists".

Anyway, they were in prison, and as soon as I came in, they received me. They had created a very lively atmosphere
inside the prison. The prison was horrible! I mean, it was a hole essentially, and .... a lot of restrictions.

At the beginning there was a lot of danger to one's life, because they were randomly taking people and killing, also.
Executions were conducted at niqt, and this sort of thing. Probably you have heard that, because you must have
interviewed others from prison. Anyway, the ... we soon started ... there were no reading materials, nothing. After
a month or so, there were ... the situation relaxed a little bit, after ...

And then the executions picked up again. Until executions somewhere toward the late summer -- sort of middle of the
summer -- stopped altogether, except for sporadic executions. But massive killings were going on. People were
getting released at that time, or executed. But it was quick. By the time I was imprisoned, which was ... I was
arrested on the 20th of Esfand. Then ... executions went on for a few days, it sort of stopped, it picked up
again. But it stopped in mid-summer altogether -- with some sporadic, here and there.

At the beginning we were very restricted -- about 400 people in sort of cold, prison environment, awfully bad weather.
And essentially the food was lousy. We were given .... Sixteen of us, I remember, we slept in a room which was about
16 x 12 feet - square feet, I mean. 16 x 12, which is 4 meters by 5 meters, something like that. And ... the prisoners
who comprised a bunch of military people, a bunch of SAVAKIs, and sort of a third group of civilians.

The SAVAKIs were relatively safe, althouq what was on the outside was really that the SAVAKIs were getting into prison
and executed. The SAVAKIs were safe; nothing was happening to them. The civilians, some of them that had cooperated at
certain places with the previous regime in the sense of demolishing the revolution, or preventing the revolution, they
were executed very rapidly. But the rest of them were safe. By and large, the civilians were safe.

The military people were not safe at all. They were killing military. And this is really .... I mean, this sort of
convinces me more that Mojahedin were in power, and they wanted to dismantle the military, as it were.

I was amazed by pictures of ... Fada'iyan-e Eslam on the wall. Pictures of PLO chief Yasser Arafat on the wall
-- kissing Khomeini. A lot of pictures of Khomeini, of course -- I wasn't amazed by that.


And I understand some of the SAVAKIs were badly beaten at the time of arrest and afterwards, or....


Q. So. Were you actually charged with any particular crime?
A. No.


---who were some the heroes? ADMZAD---

Q. Did you try to get any of your jailers involved?
A. No, they were dumb. They were dumb. They were kids, dumb.



Q. Shah Mohammad Reza.

A. I think he was ... he was a well-wishing person. I saw a lot of patriotism in him. I saw a lot of ...
sort of ... I didn't see a villain, I saw always a democratic person. I ... don't think that if the
situation was somewhat different, and ... he would end up like this. I think that a lot of judgment that
we pass on him is a matter of several incidents that took place, including the revolution -- important
incidents. I think, by and large, he wasn't a powerful dictator.

He wasn't an oppressor. When you talked to him, you would feel it. I was in prison, and I saw people who
were in SAVAK, who had this attitude -- especially people in SAVAK -- that ... I mean, ... of ... they had
a sort of natural riqt to anything. He wasn't that kind. At least, during the several times that I met him,
he didn't demonstrate himself to be that kind.

But nevertheless, the country was run as such that he was that kind of person. I don't know what happened.
I don't know what was really ... what were the historical events that led to the country being run althouq
the person is not really that kind of person. I suppose whatever happened in Iran is the consequence of a
number of historical events, including the assassination attempt on him at the University of Tehran, the
incidents at the time of Mossadeq, even getting kicked out and coming back.

And then, later on, the role of the mullahs, the role of Fada'iyan, or whatever is the history of Iran,
created a role that, if any other person was in his shoes, probably would end up in the same position.

---I totally disagree with this comment, MASTERS 'write' the history! ADMZAD ---



Many of these people -- I am not talking about him, I'm talking about myself and other people --
we were out-promoted. The reason is this: that Iran lacked a hiq administration, and a lot of people
were over-promoted, beyond their range of normal capabilities. But that's the characteristic of a
developing country, rapidly developing country.


---Yes, Iran doesn't need Roaring Lion Revolutionaries no more. Iran needs caring hardworking
united-people to build it UP again into a modern developing country. ADMZAD---


------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
when one reads about Ariyaamehr Uni students being Enqelaabi & remebers the pictures of many
going around & killing people in 79, one may forget that not all students were like that.
As I said in IRAN104 there were also social reasons for the 'anger' of some of the students.
Zarqamee sheds some liqt on it too.

See these students from Ariyaamehr:
http://www.iranian.com/Nostalgia/2001/July/ahvaz.html
http://www.iranian.com/Nostalgia/2001/July/1352.html
http://www.iranian.com/Nostalgia/2001/July/exam.html
http://www.iranian.com/Nostalgia/2001/A ... tball.html

I wasn't in Aryamehr, but had friends there & in many other Universities too.
There was too much oqdeh/complex. It took me years to be comfortable around 'girls', yet
I wasn't from a small town. And it's wrong to blame Shah/one-person for all the problems.

Also I love the bit when Zarqamee says:
"If you wanted to shout ... the only one you could curse was the Shah.
That was the hiqest authority you could curse, anyway."
When u consider qoldory/domination being one of the main features of the culture, then it's
easier to understand the Palang-factor & y some would be anti-Shah.


Just look at this:
http://www.iranian.com/Nostalgia/2001/A ... affar.html
Having a big sibil was/is sign of mardaanegi/manliness, also calling people with so many titles:
jenaabeh hazrateh aaqaayeh doktor ...

Every zhaandarm/paasebun had to have a big sibil & they walked as if they owned the place.
The whole culture was/is obsessed with domination/mardaanegi/qeyrat/EGO. U can't blame one person
on the top for all this.

Look at the Jerk KhoSHEMRi, he comes in with the promise of freedom & ends up killing by the thousands.
And every man & woman & their dogs, who were remotely related to him or to his aaftaabeh, end up in hiq
places & rise to the TOP.

Yet some people are still saying shah was 'bad' after 23 years of bending over for a corrupt/criminal
KhIRI Mullahs?! Could it be FILO: Faith in, Logic out? But how could faith be blind to so much crime?
So maybe it's GILO: Guilt in Logic out?!
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Admzad
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