Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 3
Nuclear Sites' Locations and Analysis
List of Locations Relevant to the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards
As of November 2003
Graphic: Iran's nuclear facilities
Anarak
Iran has stated that small amounts of imported UO2 were prepared for targets at JHL, irradiated at TRR, and sent to a laboratory belonging to the MIX Facility in Tehran for separation of I-131 in a lead-shielded cell. Iran has informed the Agency that the remaining nuclear waste was solidified and eventually transferred to a waste disposal site at Anarak. The operators at TRR and the MIX Facility have provided supporting documentation, which is being examined. The Agency is still awaiting relevant updated design information for the MIX Facility and TRR. Plans are in place to visit the waste site at Anarak in June 2003.
In the report Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General International Atomic Energy Agency [06 Jun 2003], the Director General identified a number of corrective actions by Iran which were necessary to enable the Agency to verify the previously unreported nuclear material declared to have been imported by Iran in 1991. These actions included the provision of design information on the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and the granting of access to that facility as well as to Anarak and Qom, where waste resulting from the processing of the imported material is stored or has been disposed of.
There are reportedly rich occurrences of uranium ore near Anarak, not far from Yazd. The famous Talmessi Mine (Talmesi Mine), near Anarak produced the first specimen of Seelite in 1955 (but were analysed and recognised as such in the early 1990's). Seelite occurs here together with Uranospinite. Uranospinite is named for the uranium content and Greek spinos, a green finch, referring to the green color.
Ardekan [Ardakan]
Nuclear Fuel Site
The possible existence of a nuclear-related facility near Ardekan [aka Ardakan or Erdekan] site was first reported on July 8, 2003, by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political wing of the People's Mujahedeen; and organization listed by the US State Department as a terrorist organization.
According to that organization, the facility is designed for the task of uranium treatment and is located somewhere in the central part of iran.
A new site under construction is the Ardekan Nuclear Fuel Unit. This site, reportedly scheduled to be completed in mid-2005, is located at the 33rd kilometer (20.5 miles) of the Ardekan-Choupanau Road. This project is supervised by an engineer named Farhad Vadoudfaam, under the supervision of the directorate of the nuclear fuel of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The Executive Director of this project is an engineer named Baghesfani. The central office of this site is located in the city of Ardekan at Shahda Square, Picheh Tazel, next to Ausari High School, number 48. One of the affiliate companies of the AEOI is doing the consulting for this site.
Mohammad Ghannadi-Maragheh, Vice President for Nuclear Fuel Production of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), discussed the project at the World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium held in London 3-5 September 2003. He said that an uranium mill with an annual capacity of 120,000 metric tonnes of ore and an annual output of 50 metric tonnes of uranium is being built 35 km north of Ardakan city.
Arak
During a press conference by the representative office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran held in Washington DC, in mid-August 2002, the existence of a secret nuclear facility at Arak was revealed. It is located at the Qatran Workshop near the Qara-Chai river in the Khondaub region, in Central Iran, 150 miles south of Tehran.
According to the National of Resistance of Iran, a front organization, named the Mesbah Energy Company, has been used to prevent unwanted disclosures. The headquarters of the Mesbah Energy Company are located in Tehran.
As a result of its clandestine nature, the project was reportedly falling outside of the budgetary supervisory purview of Iran's Organization for Planning and Budget and was also not registered officially with the AEOI's Human Resources Office. Instead, Bureaucratic operations of the project are directly supervised by the Security and Itelligence office of the AEOI and of the Central Office of Security. According to the NCRI, the project's managing director was Davood Aqajani; its supervisor was Dr. Mohammad Qannadi, Deputy for Production of Nuclear Fuel; and its operational manager was Behman Asgarpour.
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) on 12 December 2002 released an issue brief expressing concern that Iran is trying to develop "the capability to make separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the two main nuclear explosive materials." ISIS acquired satellite imagery of a site near the town of Arak, where a plant is under construction that appears to be designed to produce heavy water. Heavy water is used to moderate the nuclear chain reaction in one type of nuclear reactor, that could be used either for civilian power production or to produce bomb materials. The nuclear reactor under construction at Bushehr does not use heavy water, nor do current Iranian research reactors need it in amounts that would justify construction of such a facility.
According to information provided by the Iranian authorities, the Iranian heavy water reactor program consists of the heavy water production plant currently under construction at Arak and the 40 MW(th) IR-40, construction of which was planned to start at Arak in 2004. Although the exact date of the start of construction is unclear, it is evident from commercial satellite imagery that construction was well under way by the early weeks of 2005. Heavy Water Production Plant
Construction of the heavy water production plant at Khondab near Arak was reportedly begun in 1996 by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The heavy water plant at Arak is reportedly to use the Girdler sulphide process. Canadian plants using this process required approximately 33 TJ of steam heat at moderate temperature (130 C) per metric ton of D2O produced. The Arak plant is to have an initial capacity of 8 t/yr, and thus the plant alone could dispose of around 10 MW. The location of the facility was reportedly determined by the need for large quantities of water which can be easily supplied by the Qara-Chai river.
As of mid-August 2002, the site was said to be 85% completed with some of the facility's units able to carry nuclear tests in the Fall of 2002. Distinguishing features at the site include towers that are 3 meters thick, 48 meters high and each with 70 mesh trays.
At a 13 December 2002 briefing, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher that there was what Boucher termed "hard evidence," that Iran appeared to be constructing a uranium enrichment plant at Nantaz, as well as a heavy water plant. "The suspect uranium- enrichment plant ... could be used to produce highly- enriched uranium for weapons. The heavy-water plant could support a reactor for producing weapons-grade plutonium. These facilities are not justified by the needs of Iran's civilian nuclear program," he said.
The UN's International Atomic Energy Agency's inspectors visited Iran on 25 February 2003 to look at nuclear facilities under construction there. "We will be looking at facilities not even completed yet that are not formally under safeguards," as chief IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky puts it. The visit was the first step in a process of many visits to understand the architecture of the place and to design the most effective monitoring regime for that facility. American officials believe new nuclear facilities in Iran could be used to make nuclear weapons.
Iran strongly rejected the allegations and reiterated that the two plants were intended to generate electricity. "In the next 20 years, Iran has to produce 6,000 megawatts of electricity by nuclear plants and the launch of these two centers are aimed at producing necessary fuel for these plants," Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said.
In late 2003 the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization said Tehran had almost completed construction of the heavy water plant. Gholamreza Aghazadeh said: "This project is considered to be a remarkable feat for our country, through which Iran will acquire heavy water technology, thus placing our country's name alongside world manufactures of this industry."
According to Iranian statements, the estimated annual need for heavy water at the IR-40 is less than 1 t. In a 19 August 2003 letter to the Agency, Iran provided additional information on the amount of heavy water initially needed for the reactor (approximately 80-90 t), and on the design capacity of the heavy water production plant under construction at Khondab near Arak (8 t of heavy water per year with expansion capabilities to twice its design capacity). According to the information provided in that letter, Iran plans to start the production of heavy water in 2004. In that letter, Iran stated further that laboratory scale experiments to produce heavy water had been conducted in Esfahan in the 1980s using electrolysis techniques. In a meeting held on 29 October 2003, Iran confirmed that the construction of a second production line, with a production capacity of 8 t, had been started. It was further stated that the Khondab facility was actually a pilot plant, and that no laboratory or other experiments using the Girdler Sulphide method (to be used at the Arak facility) had been carried out in the past in Iran. [IAEA]
Aside from a small IAEA-safeguarded "zero-power" research reactor located at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, Iran has no known heavy water reactor and no need for an indigenous source of heavy water. Iran's only nuclear power reactor expected to become operational within the next decade is the light-water reactor under construction with Russian help at Bushehr. This raised questions about Iran's intentions in constructing an industrial-scale heavy water production plant at Arak. Heavy-water moderated reactors are better suited for plutonium production than are light water reactors. The US believed Iran's true intent is to develop the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, using both the plutonium route (supported ultimately by a heavy-water research reactor) and the highly enriched uranium route (supported by a gas centrifuge enrichment plant). The Arak heavy water plant only makes sense if it is paired with a plutonium production reactor.
On 27 October 2004 a group of reporters from Iran, US, the Netherlands and Germany inspected Iran`s Qatran Complex (Arak Heavy Water). The head of the Arak Research and Development Department of Qatran Complex, Manouchehr Madadi, said this is Iran`s first heavy water plant, meeting 99.8 percent of domestic requirements. Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40)
Iran attempted to buy a 30 MWt heavy water research reactor from China in 1991. But the plan to build the reactor at Isfahan fell through due to technical and financial problems.
In December 1998, US intelligence reports were publicly cited as having revealed that two Russian nuclear research institutes were actively negotiating to sell Iran a 40-megawatt heavy-water research reactor and a uranium-conversion facility.
A much-anticipated report by the International Atomic Energy Agency, distributed to governments on 06 June 2003 in advance of a meeting of the agency's board of governors on 16 June 2003, concluded that Iran has failed to comply with its nuclear safeguards agreement. The IAEA report revealed Iran is building a previously unacknowledged heavy-water research reactor at Arak. That facility could increase Iran's technological options for the production of nuclear weapons. A 05 May 2003 letter from Iran informed the agency for the first time of its intention to construct a heavy water research reactor, a type often associated with production of plutonium for nuclear weapons programs. One report suggested the reactor would have a power level of 40MW. In the 06 June 2003 IAEA Report, the Agency stated it intended to complete a more thorough expert analysis of the research and development carried out by Iran in the establishment of its enrichment capabilities. This will require Iran to submit a complete chronology of its centrifuge and laser efforts at Natanz.
On 13 July 2003 the Iranian authorities made a presentation on some technical features of the 40 MW(th) heavy water reactor (the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor, IR-40), construction of which was planned to start in 2004. The reactor, which Iranian officials have stated is based on indigenous design, is currently moving from the basic design phase to the detailed design phase. Iranian officials have further stated that Iran had tried unsuccessfully on several occasions to acquire from abroad a research reactor suitable for medical and industrial isotope production and for R&D to replace the old research reactor in Tehran. Iranian officials had concluded, therefore, that the only alternative was a heavy water reactor, which could use the UO2 produced in UCF and the Zirconium Production Plant in Esfahan. According to the Iranian authorities, to meet the isotope production requirements, such a reactor should have a neutron flux of 1013 to 1014 n/cm2/s, which would require power on the order of 30–40 MW(th) when using natural UO2 fuel.
During their visit in July 2003, IAEA inspectors were provided with drawings of the IR-40. Contrary to what would have been expected given the declared radioisotope production purpose of the facility, the drawings contained no references to hot cells. The Agency raised this issue during that visit, particularly in light of open source reports of recent efforts by Iran to acquire from abroad heavy manipulators and leaded windows designed for hot cell applications. The Agency indicated to the Iranian authorities that, given the specifications of the manipulators and windows which were the subject of those reports, a design for hot cells should have existed already and that therefore the hot cell, or cells, should already have been declared, at least on a preliminary basis, as part of the facility or as a separate installation.
The Agency was provided on 4 August 2003 with an updated DIQ, which is currently being reviewed. The DIQ does not contain any references to hot cells, contrary to what would be expected given the radioisotope production purposes of the facility. Iran has been asked to look into this matter further, particularly in light of recent open source accounts of alleged efforts by Iran to import remote manipulators and windows that would be suitable for use in hot cells.
In its 19 August 2003 letter, the AEOI provided information on the heavy water reactor program, stating that a decision to start the R&D had been taken in the early 1980s. It further stated that, in the mid-1980s, laboratory scale experiments to produce heavy water had been conducted in the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre, and that a decision to construct a heavy water reactor had been taken in the mid-1990s. The letter provided additional information on the amount of heavy water initially needed for the IR-40, and on the design capacity of the heavy water production plant under construction at Khondab near Arak. According to the information provided in the letter, Iran planned to start the production of heavy water in 2004.
In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that two hot cells had been foreseen for this project. However, according to the information provided in that letter, neither the design nor detailed information about the dimensions or the actual layout of the hot cells was available yet, since they did not know the characteristics of the manipulators and shielded windows which they could procure. On 1 November 2003, Iran confirmed that it had tentative plans to construct at the Arak site yet another building with hot cells for the production of radioisotopes. Iran has agreed to submit the relevant preliminary design information with respect to that building in due course.
According to Gholamreza Aghazadeh, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, as of the end of 2003 the basic design of the reactor had been completed. Construction was set to begin early in 2004.
As of early April 2004 Iran said construction work on the reactor was due to start within months. Iranian officials announced that construction would begin in June 2004 for the first time during talks in Tehran with Mohamed ElBaradei on 06 April 2004.
On 12 June 2004 Iran rejected European demands that it freeze additional parts of its atomic program, including the heavy-water reactor. "We will not accept any new obligation," Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said at a news conference. "If anyone asks us to give up Isfahan industries to change yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas or to give up heavy-water facilities in Arak, we cannot accept such an extra demand that is contradictory to our legal rights."
On 18 June 2004 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopted a resolution submitted by France, Germany and Britain, that called on Iran to freeze the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak and the conversionof uranium in Isfahan.
Based on construction timelines in other countries, as of 2004 Iran appeared to be at least five years away from completing the heavy water reactor at Arak. The DPRK began construction in 1979 of the 5-MWe graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon, from which it could extract and reprocess plutonium. That reactor became operational in 1986. Pakistan's Khushab heavy water reactor, with a capacity variously reported at between 40 MWT to 50 MWT [and as high as 70 MWT], was "commissioned" in March 1996, and had been under construction with Chinese assistance since the mid-1980s. According to a Pakistani press report, the Khushab plutonium production reactor had gone critical and began operating in early 1998. Begining around 1958 with French assistance, Israel constructed a natural uranium, heavy-water, research reactor at Dimona. This reactor, nominally rated at 26 megawatts thermal, was put on line in early 1964.
The five year construction period for the reactor is consistent with the five year production period of the heavy water plant. The reactor will require 80-90 tons of heavy water, and the two production lines at Arak will together produce about 16 tons of heavy water every year.
The amount of plutonium a 40MW(th) reactor could produce each year would depend on the reactor's "capacity factor" -- the percentage of time that they are actually operating. This could range from 60 percent to up to 85 percent. A capacity factor of 60% would yield about 9 kilograms each year, while a 90% capacity factor would yield 12.5 kilograms of plutonium each year. A single nuclear weapon might require 4 or 5 kilograms of plutonium, so the reactor could produce two or three atomic bombs each year. Other Activities
According to reports published in Russia, apparently based on information developed by the Russian Federal Security Service, facilities located at Arak are involved in R&D of unguided missiles, and modifications of the Scud-S missile.
Gchine
In the south of Iran, near Bandar Abbas, Iran has constructed the Gchine uranium mine and its co-located mill. The low but variable grade uranium ore found in near-surface deposits will be open-pit mined and processed at the associated mill. The estimated production design capacity is 21 t of uranium per year. Iran has stated that, as of July 2004, mining operations had started and the mill had been hot tested, during which testing a quantity of about 40 to 50 kg of yellowcake was produced.
Iran has explored two other potential uranium production routes. One was the extraction of uranium from phosphoric acid. Using research scale equipment, small quantities of yellowcake were successfully produced at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) laboratories. Iran has stated that there are no facilities in Iran for separating uranium from phosphoric acid other than the research facilities at TNRC.
The second route explored by Iran was the production of yellowcake using percolation leaching. Using this technique, Iran produced an estimated several hundred kilograms of yellowcake using temporary facilities, now dismantled, located at the Gchine mining site.
In its Additional Protocol declarations of 21 May 2004, Iran provided information to the IAEA on the location, operational status and estimated annual production capacity of the Gchine mine and mill, the Saghand Mine and the Yellowcake Production Plant. The Agency carried out complementary access at Gchine on 17 July 2004, at the Saghand Mine on 6 October 2004 and at the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant on 7 October 2004, in the course of which the Agency was able to confirm the declared status of these operations.
Access to these sites, and clarifications requested by the Agency, have been provided by Iran in a timely manner. The Agency’s assessment of the information related to these mines and mills as declared by Iran under the Additional Protocol is ongoing, as is the analysis of samples taken from those locations.