Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Capabilities

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Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Capabilities

Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 7:48 am

Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Capabilities
Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 1


Know The Enemy, before Engagement!


Preface
For 18 years Iran has been successful to hide her nuclear facilities & build up until Mojahedin exposed it all! Abdol Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's First Nuclear Scientist, Father of Paki Nuclear Science, sold nuclear secrets in Black Market to All including Iran, N. Korea, Libya, etc. Abdol Qadeer Khan was an important factor for Iran's nuclearization.

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Facilities

Click to view Map
http://images.google.com/url?q=http://6 ... 0sites.JPG

We will study & analyze the facilities in this order:

1. Anarak
2. Ardekan
3. Arak
4. Gchine
5. Bushehr
6. Karaj [Hashtgerd]
7. Kolahdouz
8. Esfahan
9. Natanz [Kashan]
10. Saghand
11. Tehran
12. Chalus
13. Darkhovin
14. Tabas
15. [ Uranium Mines ]
16. Covert Reactor?


Facilities Status Chart

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LOCATION=> MOSTLY AS OF NOVEMBER 2003 => STATUS

TEHRAN NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) [Operating]
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility) [Constructed, but not operating]
*Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) [Operating]
*Waste Handling Facility (WHF) [Operating]

TEHRAN
*Kalaye Electric Company [Dismantled pilot enrichment facility]

BUSHEHR
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) [Under construction]

ESFAHAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CENTRE
Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) [Operating]
Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR) [Operating]
Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWSPR) [Operating]
Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL) [Operating]
Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL) [Closed down]
Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) [Under construction, first process units being commissioned for operation]
Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor (GSCR) [Decommissioned]
*Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) [In detailed design stage, construction was to begin in 2004]

NATANZ
*Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant [Operating (PFEP)]
*Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) [Under construction]

KARAJ
*Radioactive Waste Storage [Under construction, but partially operating]

LASHKAR AB'AD
*Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment Plant [Dismantled]

ARAK
*Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) [In detailed design phase]
*Hot cell facility for production of radioisotopes [In preliminary design stage]
*Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) [Under construction Not subject to Safeguards Agreement]

ANARAK
*Waste storage site [Waste to be transferred to JHL]

* Facilities declared in 2003


Iran's Nuclear Facilities
http://www.globalsecurity.org

Introduction
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world ... ke-fac.htm

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Click for larger view
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world ... p_nuke.gif

In February 2003, before the top officials of the Ministry of Science, Iranian President Mohammad Khatanmi reportedly announced a program for a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which was to consist of these components:
Mining Uranium in Saghand (200 kilometers, 125 miles from Yazd) from 350 meters (1160 feet) deep.
Preparing Yellow Cake in Ardekan near Yazd (at a site known as Ardekan Nuclear Fuel Unit)
UCF Facility in Isfahan site. At the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Isfahan, using the yellow cake prepared in the Ardekan, a number of by-products including uranium hexofloride (UF6), metallic uranium, and uranium oxide (Uo2) are produced. These are later used for uranium enrichment.
Natanz Uranium Enrichment Facility. Using the yellow cake and the products of the Isaheur UCF unit, uranium is enriched using the centrifuge equipments, and nuclear fuel pellets are to be eventually produced in Natanz. These pellets could then be used to form the fuel rods.

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Some US officials suspect Iran of operating secret enrichment facilities elsewhere in the country.

In the report Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General International Atomic Energy Agency [06 Jun 2003], the Director General identified a number of corrective actions by Iran which were necessary to enable the Agency to verify the previously unreported nuclear material declared to have been imported by Iran in 1991. These actions included the provision of design information on the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and the granting of access to that facility as well as to Anarak and Qom, where waste resulting from the processing of the imported material is stored or has been disposed of.

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There remain significant such open question related to Iran's enrichment program. The 26 August 2003 IAEA report provides information making clear Iran has consistently misled the Agency about its enrichment program. First, as paragraph 30 reveals, Iran's centrifuge enrichment program did not begin in 1997, as Iran initially told the Agency, but in 1985, i.e., almost 20 year ago. Second, Iran's centrifuge program is not entirely indigenous, as Iran initially told the Agency and as AEOI President Agazadeh assured an informal meeting of the IAEA Board on 06 May 2003. Iran later said it received centrifuge drawings in 1987 from a still unnamed foreign intermediary and, in addition, Iran said it imported components for centrifuges and a cascade design. Third, the Kalaye Electric Company -- which Iran originally told the IAEA only produced centrifuge components -- now is said to have been a central part of its centrifuge testing program for five years (1997-2002); but Iran still claims, implausibly, that it never introduced nuclear material into centrifuges.

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There were also open questions in June about laser enrichment. The August 26 report suggested that those questions are still open. Iran has not allowed IAEA inspectors to take environmental samples at a key laser research site - whose existence it had previously not acknowledged - and did not let them visit the site until after some equipment, including a large imported vacuum vessel that could have applications for laser uranium enrichment, had been moved to another location.

There were also "open questions" in June 2003 about the Kalaye Electric Company site. After months of repeated requests, the Agency was finally allowed to take environmental samples there in August 2003, but the 26 August 2003 report noted that Iran had used the intervening months to make "considerable modifications" to the site that "may impact on the accuracy of the environmental sampling and the Agency's ability to verify Iran's declarations about the types of activities previously carried out here."

The IAEA discussed with Iranian officials during the meetings that took place on 9–12 August 2003. In that discussion, in contrast to earlier information provided about the launch dates of the program and its indigenous nature, AEOI officials stated that the decision to launch a centrifuge enrichment programme had actually been taken in 1985, and that Iran had received drawings of the centrifuge through a foreign intermediary around 1987. The officials described the program as having consisted of three phases: activities during the first phase, from 1985 until 1997, had been located mainly at the AEOI premises in Tehran; during the second phase, between 1997 and 2002, the activities had been concentrated at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran; during the third phase, 2002 to the present, the R&D and assembly activities were moved toNatanz.

The Iranian authorities also explained that during the first phase, components had been obtained from abroad through foreign intermediaries or directly by Iranian entities, but that no help had been received from abroad to assemble centrifuges or provide training. Efforts were concentrated on achieving an operating centrifuge, but many difficulties had been encountered as a result of machine crashes attributed to poor quality components. According to the AEOI officials, no experiments with inert or UF6 gas were conducted. Iran indicated its willingness to make available for interview key scientists responsible for that phase of the enrichment programme. According to Iranian officials, from 1997 through 2002, the activities were concentrated at Kalaye Electric Company, and in volved the assembly and testing of centrifuges, but again without inert or UF6 gas.

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An aerial shot of the Natanz nuclear facility: Iran wants to close the fuel cycle at any cost.
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Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 8:02 am

Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 2


Maps

Iran's Nuclear Sites & related maps.
http://stopthewarnow.net/iran/maps.html

TOPOGRAPHICAL AND CITIES MAP
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IRAN MILITARY SITES
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IRAN NUCLEAR SITES
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Detail of Sites
Click to view (Map Too Large to display, it will stretch the page)
http://stopthewarnow.net/iran/irannuclearfacilites2.jpg
or
http://stopthewarnow.net/iran/maps.html

IRAN TARGETING MAP - FROM ISRAEL
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US MILITARY FORCES IN MIDDLE EAST (circa 2002-2003)
Troops have been removed from Saudi Arabia and there are bases in Iraq

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The Chinese are very interested in US military capabilities!
(Chines Document)

Click to view (Map Too Large to display, it will stretch the page)
http://stopthewarnow.net/iran/usmilitaryforces2.jpg
or
http://stopthewarnow.net/iran/maps.html
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Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 8:10 am

Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 3


Nuclear Sites' Locations and Analysis

List of Locations Relevant to the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards
As of November 2003

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Graphic: Iran's nuclear facilities


Anarak

Iran has stated that small amounts of imported UO2 were prepared for targets at JHL, irradiated at TRR, and sent to a laboratory belonging to the MIX Facility in Tehran for separation of I-131 in a lead-shielded cell. Iran has informed the Agency that the remaining nuclear waste was solidified and eventually transferred to a waste disposal site at Anarak. The operators at TRR and the MIX Facility have provided supporting documentation, which is being examined. The Agency is still awaiting relevant updated design information for the MIX Facility and TRR. Plans are in place to visit the waste site at Anarak in June 2003.

In the report Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General International Atomic Energy Agency [06 Jun 2003], the Director General identified a number of corrective actions by Iran which were necessary to enable the Agency to verify the previously unreported nuclear material declared to have been imported by Iran in 1991. These actions included the provision of design information on the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and the granting of access to that facility as well as to Anarak and Qom, where waste resulting from the processing of the imported material is stored or has been disposed of.

There are reportedly rich occurrences of uranium ore near Anarak, not far from Yazd. The famous Talmessi Mine (Talmesi Mine), near Anarak produced the first specimen of Seelite in 1955 (but were analysed and recognised as such in the early 1990's). Seelite occurs here together with Uranospinite. Uranospinite is named for the uranium content and Greek spinos, a green finch, referring to the green color.


Ardekan [Ardakan]
Nuclear Fuel Site


The possible existence of a nuclear-related facility near Ardekan [aka Ardakan or Erdekan] site was first reported on July 8, 2003, by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political wing of the People's Mujahedeen; and organization listed by the US State Department as a terrorist organization.

According to that organization, the facility is designed for the task of uranium treatment and is located somewhere in the central part of iran.

A new site under construction is the Ardekan Nuclear Fuel Unit. This site, reportedly scheduled to be completed in mid-2005, is located at the 33rd kilometer (20.5 miles) of the Ardekan-Choupanau Road. This project is supervised by an engineer named Farhad Vadoudfaam, under the supervision of the directorate of the nuclear fuel of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The Executive Director of this project is an engineer named Baghesfani. The central office of this site is located in the city of Ardekan at Shahda Square, Picheh Tazel, next to Ausari High School, number 48. One of the affiliate companies of the AEOI is doing the consulting for this site.

Mohammad Ghannadi-Maragheh, Vice President for Nuclear Fuel Production of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), discussed the project at the World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium held in London 3-5 September 2003. He said that an uranium mill with an annual capacity of 120,000 metric tonnes of ore and an annual output of 50 metric tonnes of uranium is being built 35 km north of Ardakan city.


Arak

During a press conference by the representative office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran held in Washington DC, in mid-August 2002, the existence of a secret nuclear facility at Arak was revealed. It is located at the Qatran Workshop near the Qara-Chai river in the Khondaub region, in Central Iran, 150 miles south of Tehran.

According to the National of Resistance of Iran, a front organization, named the Mesbah Energy Company, has been used to prevent unwanted disclosures. The headquarters of the Mesbah Energy Company are located in Tehran.

As a result of its clandestine nature, the project was reportedly falling outside of the budgetary supervisory purview of Iran's Organization for Planning and Budget and was also not registered officially with the AEOI's Human Resources Office. Instead, Bureaucratic operations of the project are directly supervised by the Security and Itelligence office of the AEOI and of the Central Office of Security. According to the NCRI, the project's managing director was Davood Aqajani; its supervisor was Dr. Mohammad Qannadi, Deputy for Production of Nuclear Fuel; and its operational manager was Behman Asgarpour.

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) on 12 December 2002 released an issue brief expressing concern that Iran is trying to develop "the capability to make separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the two main nuclear explosive materials." ISIS acquired satellite imagery of a site near the town of Arak, where a plant is under construction that appears to be designed to produce heavy water. Heavy water is used to moderate the nuclear chain reaction in one type of nuclear reactor, that could be used either for civilian power production or to produce bomb materials. The nuclear reactor under construction at Bushehr does not use heavy water, nor do current Iranian research reactors need it in amounts that would justify construction of such a facility.

According to information provided by the Iranian authorities, the Iranian heavy water reactor program consists of the heavy water production plant currently under construction at Arak and the 40 MW(th) IR-40, construction of which was planned to start at Arak in 2004. Although the exact date of the start of construction is unclear, it is evident from commercial satellite imagery that construction was well under way by the early weeks of 2005. Heavy Water Production Plant

Construction of the heavy water production plant at Khondab near Arak was reportedly begun in 1996 by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The heavy water plant at Arak is reportedly to use the Girdler sulphide process. Canadian plants using this process required approximately 33 TJ of steam heat at moderate temperature (130 C) per metric ton of D2O produced. The Arak plant is to have an initial capacity of 8 t/yr, and thus the plant alone could dispose of around 10 MW. The location of the facility was reportedly determined by the need for large quantities of water which can be easily supplied by the Qara-Chai river.

As of mid-August 2002, the site was said to be 85% completed with some of the facility's units able to carry nuclear tests in the Fall of 2002. Distinguishing features at the site include towers that are 3 meters thick, 48 meters high and each with 70 mesh trays.

At a 13 December 2002 briefing, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher that there was what Boucher termed "hard evidence," that Iran appeared to be constructing a uranium enrichment plant at Nantaz, as well as a heavy water plant. "The suspect uranium- enrichment plant ... could be used to produce highly- enriched uranium for weapons. The heavy-water plant could support a reactor for producing weapons-grade plutonium. These facilities are not justified by the needs of Iran's civilian nuclear program," he said.

The UN's International Atomic Energy Agency's inspectors visited Iran on 25 February 2003 to look at nuclear facilities under construction there. "We will be looking at facilities not even completed yet that are not formally under safeguards," as chief IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky puts it. The visit was the first step in a process of many visits to understand the architecture of the place and to design the most effective monitoring regime for that facility. American officials believe new nuclear facilities in Iran could be used to make nuclear weapons.

Iran strongly rejected the allegations and reiterated that the two plants were intended to generate electricity. "In the next 20 years, Iran has to produce 6,000 megawatts of electricity by nuclear plants and the launch of these two centers are aimed at producing necessary fuel for these plants," Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said.

In late 2003 the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization said Tehran had almost completed construction of the heavy water plant. Gholamreza Aghazadeh said: "This project is considered to be a remarkable feat for our country, through which Iran will acquire heavy water technology, thus placing our country's name alongside world manufactures of this industry."

According to Iranian statements, the estimated annual need for heavy water at the IR-40 is less than 1 t. In a 19 August 2003 letter to the Agency, Iran provided additional information on the amount of heavy water initially needed for the reactor (approximately 80-90 t), and on the design capacity of the heavy water production plant under construction at Khondab near Arak (8 t of heavy water per year with expansion capabilities to twice its design capacity). According to the information provided in that letter, Iran plans to start the production of heavy water in 2004. In that letter, Iran stated further that laboratory scale experiments to produce heavy water had been conducted in Esfahan in the 1980s using electrolysis techniques. In a meeting held on 29 October 2003, Iran confirmed that the construction of a second production line, with a production capacity of 8 t, had been started. It was further stated that the Khondab facility was actually a pilot plant, and that no laboratory or other experiments using the Girdler Sulphide method (to be used at the Arak facility) had been carried out in the past in Iran. [IAEA]

Aside from a small IAEA-safeguarded "zero-power" research reactor located at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, Iran has no known heavy water reactor and no need for an indigenous source of heavy water. Iran's only nuclear power reactor expected to become operational within the next decade is the light-water reactor under construction with Russian help at Bushehr. This raised questions about Iran's intentions in constructing an industrial-scale heavy water production plant at Arak. Heavy-water moderated reactors are better suited for plutonium production than are light water reactors. The US believed Iran's true intent is to develop the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, using both the plutonium route (supported ultimately by a heavy-water research reactor) and the highly enriched uranium route (supported by a gas centrifuge enrichment plant). The Arak heavy water plant only makes sense if it is paired with a plutonium production reactor.

On 27 October 2004 a group of reporters from Iran, US, the Netherlands and Germany inspected Iran`s Qatran Complex (Arak Heavy Water). The head of the Arak Research and Development Department of Qatran Complex, Manouchehr Madadi, said this is Iran`s first heavy water plant, meeting 99.8 percent of domestic requirements. Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40)

Iran attempted to buy a 30 MWt heavy water research reactor from China in 1991. But the plan to build the reactor at Isfahan fell through due to technical and financial problems.

In December 1998, US intelligence reports were publicly cited as having revealed that two Russian nuclear research institutes were actively negotiating to sell Iran a 40-megawatt heavy-water research reactor and a uranium-conversion facility.

A much-anticipated report by the International Atomic Energy Agency, distributed to governments on 06 June 2003 in advance of a meeting of the agency's board of governors on 16 June 2003, concluded that Iran has failed to comply with its nuclear safeguards agreement. The IAEA report revealed Iran is building a previously unacknowledged heavy-water research reactor at Arak. That facility could increase Iran's technological options for the production of nuclear weapons. A 05 May 2003 letter from Iran informed the agency for the first time of its intention to construct a heavy water research reactor, a type often associated with production of plutonium for nuclear weapons programs. One report suggested the reactor would have a power level of 40MW. In the 06 June 2003 IAEA Report, the Agency stated it intended to complete a more thorough expert analysis of the research and development carried out by Iran in the establishment of its enrichment capabilities. This will require Iran to submit a complete chronology of its centrifuge and laser efforts at Natanz.

On 13 July 2003 the Iranian authorities made a presentation on some technical features of the 40 MW(th) heavy water reactor (the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor, IR-40), construction of which was planned to start in 2004. The reactor, which Iranian officials have stated is based on indigenous design, is currently moving from the basic design phase to the detailed design phase. Iranian officials have further stated that Iran had tried unsuccessfully on several occasions to acquire from abroad a research reactor suitable for medical and industrial isotope production and for R&D to replace the old research reactor in Tehran. Iranian officials had concluded, therefore, that the only alternative was a heavy water reactor, which could use the UO2 produced in UCF and the Zirconium Production Plant in Esfahan. According to the Iranian authorities, to meet the isotope production requirements, such a reactor should have a neutron flux of 1013 to 1014 n/cm2/s, which would require power on the order of 30–40 MW(th) when using natural UO2 fuel.

During their visit in July 2003, IAEA inspectors were provided with drawings of the IR-40. Contrary to what would have been expected given the declared radioisotope production purpose of the facility, the drawings contained no references to hot cells. The Agency raised this issue during that visit, particularly in light of open source reports of recent efforts by Iran to acquire from abroad heavy manipulators and leaded windows designed for hot cell applications. The Agency indicated to the Iranian authorities that, given the specifications of the manipulators and windows which were the subject of those reports, a design for hot cells should have existed already and that therefore the hot cell, or cells, should already have been declared, at least on a preliminary basis, as part of the facility or as a separate installation.

The Agency was provided on 4 August 2003 with an updated DIQ, which is currently being reviewed. The DIQ does not contain any references to hot cells, contrary to what would be expected given the radioisotope production purposes of the facility. Iran has been asked to look into this matter further, particularly in light of recent open source accounts of alleged efforts by Iran to import remote manipulators and windows that would be suitable for use in hot cells.

In its 19 August 2003 letter, the AEOI provided information on the heavy water reactor program, stating that a decision to start the R&D had been taken in the early 1980s. It further stated that, in the mid-1980s, laboratory scale experiments to produce heavy water had been conducted in the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre, and that a decision to construct a heavy water reactor had been taken in the mid-1990s. The letter provided additional information on the amount of heavy water initially needed for the IR-40, and on the design capacity of the heavy water production plant under construction at Khondab near Arak. According to the information provided in the letter, Iran planned to start the production of heavy water in 2004.

In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that two hot cells had been foreseen for this project. However, according to the information provided in that letter, neither the design nor detailed information about the dimensions or the actual layout of the hot cells was available yet, since they did not know the characteristics of the manipulators and shielded windows which they could procure. On 1 November 2003, Iran confirmed that it had tentative plans to construct at the Arak site yet another building with hot cells for the production of radioisotopes. Iran has agreed to submit the relevant preliminary design information with respect to that building in due course.

According to Gholamreza Aghazadeh, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, as of the end of 2003 the basic design of the reactor had been completed. Construction was set to begin early in 2004.

As of early April 2004 Iran said construction work on the reactor was due to start within months. Iranian officials announced that construction would begin in June 2004 for the first time during talks in Tehran with Mohamed ElBaradei on 06 April 2004.

On 12 June 2004 Iran rejected European demands that it freeze additional parts of its atomic program, including the heavy-water reactor. "We will not accept any new obligation," Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said at a news conference. "If anyone asks us to give up Isfahan industries to change yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas or to give up heavy-water facilities in Arak, we cannot accept such an extra demand that is contradictory to our legal rights."

On 18 June 2004 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopted a resolution submitted by France, Germany and Britain, that called on Iran to freeze the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak and the conversionof uranium in Isfahan.

Based on construction timelines in other countries, as of 2004 Iran appeared to be at least five years away from completing the heavy water reactor at Arak. The DPRK began construction in 1979 of the 5-MWe graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon, from which it could extract and reprocess plutonium. That reactor became operational in 1986. Pakistan's Khushab heavy water reactor, with a capacity variously reported at between 40 MWT to 50 MWT [and as high as 70 MWT], was "commissioned" in March 1996, and had been under construction with Chinese assistance since the mid-1980s. According to a Pakistani press report, the Khushab plutonium production reactor had gone critical and began operating in early 1998. Begining around 1958 with French assistance, Israel constructed a natural uranium, heavy-water, research reactor at Dimona. This reactor, nominally rated at 26 megawatts thermal, was put on line in early 1964.

The five year construction period for the reactor is consistent with the five year production period of the heavy water plant. The reactor will require 80-90 tons of heavy water, and the two production lines at Arak will together produce about 16 tons of heavy water every year.

The amount of plutonium a 40MW(th) reactor could produce each year would depend on the reactor's "capacity factor" -- the percentage of time that they are actually operating. This could range from 60 percent to up to 85 percent. A capacity factor of 60% would yield about 9 kilograms each year, while a 90% capacity factor would yield 12.5 kilograms of plutonium each year. A single nuclear weapon might require 4 or 5 kilograms of plutonium, so the reactor could produce two or three atomic bombs each year. Other Activities

According to reports published in Russia, apparently based on information developed by the Russian Federal Security Service, facilities located at Arak are involved in R&D of unguided missiles, and modifications of the Scud-S missile.


Gchine

In the south of Iran, near Bandar Abbas, Iran has constructed the Gchine uranium mine and its co-located mill. The low but variable grade uranium ore found in near-surface deposits will be open-pit mined and processed at the associated mill. The estimated production design capacity is 21 t of uranium per year. Iran has stated that, as of July 2004, mining operations had started and the mill had been hot tested, during which testing a quantity of about 40 to 50 kg of yellowcake was produced.

Iran has explored two other potential uranium production routes. One was the extraction of uranium from phosphoric acid. Using research scale equipment, small quantities of yellowcake were successfully produced at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) laboratories. Iran has stated that there are no facilities in Iran for separating uranium from phosphoric acid other than the research facilities at TNRC.

The second route explored by Iran was the production of yellowcake using percolation leaching. Using this technique, Iran produced an estimated several hundred kilograms of yellowcake using temporary facilities, now dismantled, located at the Gchine mining site.

In its Additional Protocol declarations of 21 May 2004, Iran provided information to the IAEA on the location, operational status and estimated annual production capacity of the Gchine mine and mill, the Saghand Mine and the Yellowcake Production Plant. The Agency carried out complementary access at Gchine on 17 July 2004, at the Saghand Mine on 6 October 2004 and at the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant on 7 October 2004, in the course of which the Agency was able to confirm the declared status of these operations.

Access to these sites, and clarifications requested by the Agency, have been provided by Iran in a timely manner. The Agency’s assessment of the information related to these mines and mills as declared by Iran under the Additional Protocol is ongoing, as is the analysis of samples taken from those locations.
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Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 8:13 am

Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 4



Bushehr

The focus of a considerable amount of controversy in the United States, the nuclear facility at Brushehr, Iran is being built under an agreement between the Russian and Iranian governments for $800-million. Although originally intended to be the location of a German-built reactor in the 1970s, the new reactor will be built to Russian designs, though the original reactor buildings exterior appearance will remain essentially the same. There are two reactors at Bushehr, one is in an advanced stage of completion the other has not been worked on for some time and is not currently scheduled to be completed.

Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, though it has not ratified two additional protocols to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Program 93 + 2, which is designed to prevent states from developing nuclear weapons covertly despite IAEA inspections as Iraq was able to do prior to the Gulf War. Iran maintains that it will not ratify 93 + 2 due to it being denied civilian nuclear technology for Bushehr, despite its positive record with the IAEA.

Nuclear power industry contacts between Iran and Russia are based on the intergovernmental agreements of 25 August 1992, on cooperation in the civil use of nuclear energy and in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran. American Opposition

On 23 February 1998, the US State Department reaffirmed US opposition to Iran's nuclear program. The United States has argued that Iran has sufficient oil and gas reserves for power generation, and that nuclear reactors are expensive, unnecessary, and could be used for military purposes. The United States strongly opposes the project, which was permitted under the NPT, and has in the past provided Russia with intelligence information pointing to the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Despite this, the Russians appeared to be proceeding with work on Bushehr.

US opposition to Russian construction of Bushehr rests on three issues; first that weapons grade plutonium could be extracted from the reactor allowing the Iranians to construct nuclear weapons. Secondly, the US fears that the Russians and the Iranians are using Bushehr as a cover for the transfer of other sensitive technology that would normally be prohibited. Finally, the US is concerned that the knowledge gained by Iranian scientists working at Bushehr could further Irans nuclear weapons program.

US pressure to prevent the construction of Brushehr has not been limited to Russia. On March 6, 1998, during a visit by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Ukraine announced that it would not sell turbines for use with reactors at Bushehr. The contract had been worth $45 million. Five days later, Vice President Gore met with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and discussed, among other things, US concerns over Russian exports of nuclear and missile technology to Iran.

Iran claims that its nuclear power is for peaceful purposes and that it will help free up oil and gas resources for export, thus generating additional hard-currency revenues. Construction Progress

A major question involved with the Bushehr site concerns the degree to which the site is complete and the estimated time until the facility becomes fully operational. The original contract signed by the Russians and the Iranians sets delivery to be no later than March 19, 2004 (or the end of the Iranian year 1382).

High resolution satellite imagery, from the Space Imaging IKONOS satellite, disclosed that the external structure of the first reactor unit is substantially complete. In comparison with lower resolution imagery from the late 1990s, it is quite evident that substantial progress had been made in recent years in preparing this unit for the installation of the reactor and associated equipement. There was little evidence of progress towards completion of the second reactor unit.

During a March 2001 Moscow summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, delays in delivering the first plant — first ordered in the mid-1990s — had been a source of friction between Iran and Russia.

In April 2001 an Iranian News Agency report states that the main nuclear reactor had already been completed and was being transported from Russia to Bushehr. The reports also stated that as of April 2001, the first phase of the construction project was 51 percent complete, though it is unclear how many phases are involved in the projects construction.

A June 27, 2001 Interfax report claimed that the Bushehr facility is over 80 percent complete, despite numerous work slowdowns associated with the pouring of additional concrete so that the German building might properly house the Russian system, and it appears that the original blueprints for the facility had to be remade. Additionally, Russian and Iranian officils were as recently as August 2001 quoted as saying that the facility will be completed by the end of 2001. But Leningrad Metallurgy Plant stated in early August 2001 that the assembly of the main components of the 1,000 MW turbine will be complete in December 2001. It is unclear what the status of the rest of the system is, as officials in Tehran were quoted in the May 10, 2001 MEED Quarterly Report - Iran as saying that Bushehr may not come on line for three years.

On 04 September 2001 the Interfax News Agency bulletin quoted Deputy Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Reshetnikov as saying that Unit I will not be complete until early 2004, that the actual reactor will be sent to Bushehr in November 2001, and that the Russians have begun to install the main equipment, noting that the project was 55 to 60 percent complete.

Reports indicate that the core casing, the upper unit of the reactor and some other units were delivered to Iran in November 2001.

In March 2002 Russian Nuclear Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said that the Bushehr reactor would be completed by 2005 as planned, noting that "Iran has signed all required international agreements and undertaken full obligations on transparency and checks ... and unfailingly fulfilled them." He said that under a new law passed by the Russian parliament in 2001 which strengthened non-proliferation guarantees by allowing spent fuel from nuclear power plants abroad taken back to Russia for reprocessing, Russia "will ship nuclear fuel to Iran under the contract which envisages that the spent fuel will be taken back to Russia."

A Feb. 15 2002 Interfax News Agency report quotes sources within the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy that unit 1 of the facility would be operational in Sept 2003.

An April 17, 2002 IranMania.com report quotes the Head of the Iranian Parliament's Energy Commission who stated that the first phase of the Bushehr plant will become operational in September 2002.

A May 10, 2002 Washington Times article by Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough reports that several batteries of US made Hawk (Improved) Surface-to-Air Missiles have been placed around Bushehr. The report cited leaked information from intelligence sources who claimed that recent satellite imagery showed the Hawks.

As of mid-2002 Russia had around 600 workers in Bushehr building the 1,000-megawatt reactor. At that time the installation of the reactor's main turbine was expected to begin as soon as August 2002.

On 25 December 2002 Iran and Russia signed an agreement to speed up the completion of the nuclear power plant. Under the one-billion-dollar deal, Russia had initially undertaken to finish the Bushehr plant by 2005, but the country later announced it could be completed by the end of 2003.

Taking part in a joint press conference on 25 December 2002, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Romyantsov and head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Gholam-Reza Aqazadeh said that the Bushehr nuclear site was to come on stream by the end of 2003, after Russia declared it was preparing to adjust the Bushehr site's equipment.

Visiting Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov in a news conference on 11 March 2003 said Moscow would continue its nuclear-energy cooperation with Iran within the guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Bushehr nuclear power plant was to come on line during the "latter part" of the next Iranian year that begins on 21 March 2003, its manager Nasser Shariflu told the Persian daily "Iran" on 11 March. Shariflu said Iran and Russia had begun talks on building a second such plant in Bushehr. He said most of the construction work of the first plant is complete and that Iranian experts and more than 1,000 Russian technicians are now installing "peripheral" equipment. He said that 750 Iranian technicians who were trained in Russia will take over the operations of the plant, which Shariflu says will produce 1,000 megawatts of power during its first phase. ITAR-TASS reported that the Russian-Iranian coordination committee met in Novovoronezh on 11 March to discuss the training of Iranian personnel to work at the Bushehr nuclear reactor. By the time Bushehr becomes operational in 2004, more than 700 Iranians will have been trained in more than 30 nuclear specialties. More than 400 Iranians already have been trained. Training center Director Aleksandr Ivanchenko said, "They are good professionals with university degrees, also from European universities, who have been carefully selected for training." [ SOURCE]

Independent defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer suggested in an 05 June 2003 op-ed for "The Moscow Times" that "In the last year the building of the Bushehr reactor has been legally taken over by one of Russia's oligarchs, and the [Atomic Energy] Ministry is not in charge anymore. The Iranians are paying very generously, in cash, for work done. If the U.S. wants to stop the nuclear cooperation promptly, it should talk compensation with the real people in charge, not irrelevant officials, including President Vladimir Putin." Felgenhauer had reference to United Heavy Machinery (OMZ). Headed by Kakha Bendukidze, who is a vocal member of the oligarchic lobbying club known as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, OMZ recently took a plunge into nuclear-power engineering. In March, OMZ purchased a 19.9 percent stake in Atomenergoexport (AEE) and a 50.94 percent stake in Zarubezhenergoproekt, "Izvestiya" reported on 28 March 2003. AEE subsidiary Atomstroiexport is building Bushehr, and OMZ is its main subcontractor.

Iranian officials said they expected the reactor to come on line in late 2003 or early 2004. In early June 2003 Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev was reported to have said the Bushehr reactor was set to open in 2005, not 2004 as originally planned, because some equipment had to be replaced. Some observers suggested that the delay might indicate that Moscow had tacitly yielded to US pressure to slow down the project until Iran proves it is not covertly building nuclear weapons.

Israel's "Yediot Aharonot" newspaper reported on 23 August 2004 that Israeli officials were skeptical about Iranian claims that the completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor will be delayed by one year. According to the Israeli daily, Israeli and US satellite imagery shows that the water pipes needed to cool the reactor were installed in 2002, and "according to Israeli experts, that is proof that the reactor has reached the point where it is being prepared for operation." An anonymous "Israeli expert" claimed that the "Iranians are conducting a massive cover-up about the reactor." On 13 November 2005 the head of Russia's Security Council says work to build the nuclear-power plant in Iran was more than 80 percent completed. Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov, on a visit to Tehran, said Russian specialists were actively working at the Bushehr facility in southern Iran. At that time the $800 million Russian-built reactor was scheduled to come on line by the end of 2006. Fueling the Reactor

On 23 December 2002 Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said that Novosibirsk enterprises of the Russia Nuclear Energy Ministry had manufactured 180 fuel rods for the first reactor unit of the nuclear power pant built in Bushehr. He added that the 'fuel rods will stay at the plant until the signing of an addendum to the acting agreement and equipping a storage facility for these elements in Iran by means of physical safeguarding at a level not lower than the standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency'. Iran has begun work 'to prepare a room for fuel storage and its equipment by means of physical safeguarding'. The total weight of the irradiated fuel rods for the first loading of the Bushehr reactor is 90 tons. Russia will deliver them to Iran by four flights of transport planes.

Iran initially announced that it will receive its first shipment of 90 tons of enriched uranium from Russia in May 2003. However, on 12 June 2003 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that Russia would deliver nuclear fuel for the nuclear power station in Iran only after Tehran signs a memorandum binding it to return spent fuel to Russia. "As for the nuclear plant in Bushehr that is fully controlled by the IAEA, Russian fuel will be delivered there only in case Iran signs a memorandum obliging it to export the spent nuclear fuel back to Russia... We want Iran to observe all understandings with the IAEA. Iran itself should be interested in all programs being transparent and controllable so that there would be no ambiguity or variety of interpretation on the matter," Ivanov said. Russian statements conflicted as to whether the shipment of the fuel would be conditional on Iran signing the Additional Verfication Protocol, which would give IAEA inspectors access to non-declared facilities.

On 13 October 2003 a Russian official said there would be a delay of one year in the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power reactor. "Right now our specialists are drawing up a detailed plan for the plant and the start-up is set for 2005" as opposed to 2004, Nikolai Shingaryev, a senior spokesman for the atomic energy ministry, told AFP by telephone. "The reasons are purely technical, not political," he said. "There is a huge amount of equipment that is needed. Equipment (that we thought) would work is not going to work," he said.

In mid-November 2003 Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said it could be several months more before Moscow and Tehran sign the deal on spent fuel. The signing has been postponed repeatedly since the beginning of this year. The agreement is important because it would clear the way for Moscow to complete construction of Iran's first nuclear power reactor at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf. Rumyantsev said there is no rush to sign the agreement because Russian fuel shipments to Bushehr are not scheduled to start until early next year. Iranian officials, he said, are too busy opening their nuclear program to closer inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna to finalize the agreement now. Under US pressure, Russia has agreed not deliver any fuel to the Bushehr power plant until Iran signs the agreement, one of whose provisions requires Iran agree to return all of the reactor's spent fuel back to Russia for disposal.

On 13 February 2004 a Russian Energy Ministry official said that Iran and Russia might sign the protocol on exporting Russian nuclear fuel to Iran`s Bushehr Nuclear Plant and return of the use fuel to Russia within the next two weeks. The official said "The controversial protocol, that would pave the way for making functional Iran`s Bushehr Nuclear Plant, and Russia`s access to the major part of its money for completing the said plant, would be signed very soon, and no later than a fortnight from now." He emphasized, "When that protocol would be signed by the two countries` concerned officials, there would be practically no more obstacles on the way for making operational the Bushehr Nuclear Plant."

Russia withheld fuel for the reactor because of international concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran and Russia will sign a deal in the summer of 2004 on the return of spent nuclear fuel Russia will provide for the Bushehr plant. The deal is intended to prevent the extraction of plutonium from spent fuel and its possible use in nuclear warheads. Russian officials had stated in the past that they will not ship fuel to the plant without an accord on the repatriation of spent fuel. US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton had urged Russia not to supply nuclear fuel for Bushehr reactor until Tehran addressed the full range of concerns about Iran's nuclear-weapons efforts.

On 22 August 2004 the head of Iran`s Atomic Energy Organization Asadollah Sabouri, said Bushehr will become operational in October 2006, a year behind schedule. The contract for the return of the spent fuel, has been finalized, and differences exist over the costs, the official said. According to Sabouri, the two countries have set the deadline for Russia`s delivery of nuclear fuel for the power plant to Iran at the end of 2005.

On 11 December 2004 Speaker of the Russian Federation Council Sergei Mironov stated that the first unit of the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be put into commission in 2006. He made the remarks during an official visit to Iran. "Moscow has a principled position on Russian-Iranian nuclear energy cooperation. Iran as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," the speaker stressed.

On February 27, 2005, and after a one-day delay, Iran and Russia finally signed an agreement regarding providing the needed nuclear fuel for the Bushehr facility. Under the terms of the aggreement, Russia would provide nuclear fuel to Iran, who would in turn return the spent fuel back to Russia.

Russian Rosenergoatom Atomic Energy Concern's Novovoronezh center, as of early March 2005, had provided training for 650 specialists who are to staff the Bushehr nuclear power plant. An additional 700 Iranian engineers were expected to be trained before the end of 2005.

On 22 November 2005 a senior Russian official said that Moscow would not ship nuclear fuel to the Bushehr plant it is building for Iran before the facility's scheduled completion by mid-2006. Additional Reactors

Iran has also been considering the construction of three to five additional reactor facilities, which may or may not be located at Bushehr, for an estimated cost of $3.2 billion. A Sept. 5, 2001 Moscow Times report indicates that the Russians will be submitting plans for the construction of additional reactors at Bushehr and that negotiations could begin as soon as December 2001, though the number of reactors being proposed is unclear nor is it apparrent how much the project might cost. It is estimated that the total cost of building the reactor complex at Bushehr may be roughly $4-6 billion since construction began in 1976.

During a March 2001 Moscow summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, Khatami confirmed plans to order a second reactor after the first is delivered, possibly by late 2002. The Iranian leader signaled his intention to proceed with a second contract that could be worth up to $1 billion.

On 26 July 2002 the Russian government indicated that it planned to continue building new nuclear reactors in Iran as part of a draft plan outlining potential areas of economic, industrial and scientific cooperation with Iran over the coming decade. The document approved by Prime Minister Mikhail M. Kasyanov outlined plans to build three more reactors at the Bushehr site. The document also indicated that Russia would offer to build two more reactors at a new nuclear power station at Ahwaz, a city about 60 miles from Iran's border with Iraq. These plans were apparently shelved after complaints by the United States.

In was reported on by IRNA on August 26, 2003, that Iran had received from Russia feasibility studies for a second reactor at Bushehr. According to that report, Russian specialists believed that it would be more practical to build two reactors from scratch rather than continue working on the reactor on which had been abandoned by Siemens under pressure from the United States. The studies had been achieved by the time of Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev's visit to Tehran in December 2002. Nuclear Weapons Potential

President Mohammad Khatami said on 23 December 2002 that Iran was committed to its obligations and had no intention to develop nuclear weapons. He said that Iran's willingness to send spent fuel back to Russia showed that it did not want to use it for weapons, since the nuclear waste from Bushire plant would be taken to Russia for safekeeping.

According to Paul Leventhal of the Nuclear Control Institute, if Iran were to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty and renounce the agreement with Russia, the Bushehr reactor could produce a quarter ton of plutonium per year, which Leventhal says is enough for at least 30 atomic bombs. See also Plutonium from Light Water Reactors as Nuclear Material, Harmon W.Hubbard, April 2003.

Normally for electrical power production the uranium fuel remains in the reactor for three to four years, which produces a plutonium of 60 percent or less Pu-239, 25 percent or more Pu-240, 10 percent or more Pu-241, and a few percent Pu-242. The Pu-240 has a high spontaneous rate of fission, and the amount of Pu-240 in weapons-grade plutonium generally does not exceed 6 percent, with the remaining 93 percent Pu-239. Higher concentrations of Pu-240 can result in pre-detonation of the weapon, significantly reducing yield and reliability. For the production of weapons-grade plutonium with lower Pu-240 concentrations, the fuel rods in a reactor have to be changed frequently, about every four months or less.
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Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 8:29 am

Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 5



Karaj / Hashtgerd

The Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine in Karaj, 100 miles (160 km) northwest of Tehran, includes a recently constructed building which houses a dosimetry laboratory and an agricultural radiochemistry laboratory. Several other buildings under construction at the facility, including one which will house a calutron electromagnetic isotope separation system purchased from China for obtaining target materials to be radiated with neutron streams in a 30 million electron volt cyclotron. Construction of the Belgian-supplied Beam Applications cyclotron was completed in January 1995. The calutron building reportedly has a ventilation system and radiation protection facilities which would not readily support work with radioactive material. These facilities do not appear readily applicable to nuclear weapons development or production work, and as of the mid-90s there were no indications of other facilities at this site adapted for work with radioactive materials.

During the 1990s the most detailed and apparently least reliable reports of Iran’s weapons programs are from the People's Mujahideen [a violent anti-regime group], including the claim that a nuclear reactor was being constructed at Karaj. By early 2003, the quality of reporting by this group was greatly improved.

According to reports published in Russia, apparently based on information developed by the Russian Federal Security Service, a facility at Karaj is also a site for R&D and production of unguided missiles [not further identified]. The Defense Technology and Science Research Center, a branch of the Defense Industry Organization, is said to be the primary design center for Iran's missile program. The center, located outside Karaj, also directs various other research efforts, which may be conducted with support from Russian and Chinese experts.

Iran claims, as the IAEA reports, that it is building a sophisticated enrichment facility at Natanz without experimenting elsewhere first. Iran says this was possible by modelling and simulation. IAEA inspectors are seeking to evaluate a workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, where Iran admits only that some centrifuge components were made. In May 2003 the opposition National Council of Resistance suggested taking a closer look at two laboratories near Karaj, west of Tehran. The facilities are two small laboratories that operate as satellite plants to a larger nuclear facility in Natanz, in central Iran. [In a gesture toward Iran, the US Government has classified the organization as a terrorist group.] According to a council official, Ali Safavi, the two labs were intended to function as a backup to the Natanz site in case that facility came under military attack. The labs, he said, are both in the Hasthgerd region near Karaj, about 40 kilometers (25 miles) west of Tehran. He said construction at the sites began in 2000 under strict security.

Some parts for centrifuges to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium are imported, and others built at a plant in Isfahan. They are then tested at the Kalaye plant in Ab-Ali and sent to Natanz for final assembly. Two villages near Natanz -- called Lashgarabad and Ramandeh -- have uranium enrichment plants hidden behind trees in orchards and were surrounded by security guards. The villages are located near Karaj, which is said to be the center of Iran's missile industry. In case Natanz was bombed, these two sites near Karaj would be used to produce enriched uranium so that the nuclear weapons program of the Iran regime would not be interrupted.

During the follow-up technical discussions with the IAEA, which were held from 10 to 13 July 2003 in Iran, the Agency team inquired as to whether, in accordance with a stated commitment to full transparency, Iran would permit the Agency to visit two locations near Hashtgerd (Lashkar Ab’ad and Ramandeh) at which it had been alleged, according to recent reports in open sources, that nuclear related activities were being or had been conducted. The Iranian authorities indicated that they were not yet willing at this stage to accede to the Agency’s request to visit the two locations near Hashtgerd. The Iranian authorities indicated that they would like to propose a comprehensive solution to all of the enrichment related issues, but that it would take some time on their side.

On 23 July 2003, the Agency received from the AEOI Vice President of Nuclear Safety and Safeguards a letter proposing a timetable for actions to be taken by 15 August 2003 in relation to urgent outstanding issues. In its reply of 25 July 2003, the Agency agreed to send to Iran a team of technical experts, with the understanding that the team would visit the sites near Hashtgerd. This mission took place from 9 through 12 August 2003.

Iran has a substantial R&D program on lasers. Iran has stated that it currently has no program for laser isotope separation.

In May 2003, the Agency requested additional information about two sites near Hashtgerd owned by the AEOI which had been referred to in open source reports as locations allegedly engaged in laser and centrifuge uranium enrichment activities. The Agency was permitted to visit those locations on 12 August 2003.

One of the locations was Ramandeh, which belongs to the AEOI and is part of the Karaj Agricultural and Medical Centre. This location is primarily involved with agricultural studies said to be unrelated to nuclear fuel cycle activities. The other location visited was a laser laboratory at Lashkar Ab’ad belonging to the Research and Development Division of the AEOI. During that visit, Iranian officials stated that the laboratory had originally been devoted to laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy, but that the focus of the laboratory had been changed, and the equipment not related to current projects, such as a large imported vacuum vessel, had been moved. Among other activities observed by the Agency were the production and testing of copper vapor lasers of up to 100 watts. However, there appeared to be no activities directly related to laser spectroscopy or enrichment being carried out at the laboratory. The Iranian authorities were asked to confirm that there had not been in the past any activities related to uranium laser enrichment at this location or at any other location in Iran. The Agency requested permission to take environmental samples at the laboratory, which the Iranian authorities have undertaken to consider.

During discussions which took place in Iran from 2 to 3 October 2003, in response to Agency questioning, the Iranian authorities acknowledged that Iran had imported and installed at TNRC laser related equipment from two countries: in 1992, a laser spectroscopy laboratory intended for the study of laser induced fusion, optogalvanic phenomena and photoionization spectroscopy; and in 2000, a large vacuum vessel, now stored at Karaj, for use in the spectroscopic studies referred to in the previous paragraph.

On 6 October 2003, the inspectors also visited a warehouse in the Karaj Agricultural and Medical Centre of the AEOI, where a large imported vacuum vessel and associated hardware were stored. The Iranian authorities stated that the equipment had been imported in 2000, that it had never been used, and that it had now been packed for shipment back to the manufacturer, since the contract related to its supply had been terminated by the foreign partner in 2000. The inspectors were informed that later during their visit to Tehran the equipment related to the laboratory imported in 1992 would be made available for examination and environmental sampling and the individuals involved in the projects would be available for interviews. However, these interviews and the presentation of the equipment were deferred by Iran.

Iran stated that uranium laser enrichment experiments had been conducted between October 2002 and January 2003 using previously undeclared natural uranium metal imported from one of the other suppliers. According to Iranian authorities, all of the equipment was dismantled in May 2003 and transferred to Karaj for storage together with the uranium metal. The equipment and material were presented to Agency inspectors at Karaj on 28 October 2003.

As of November 2003, the Iran had still failed to provide design information for the laser laboratories at TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad, and locations where resulting wastes were processed and stored, including the waste storage facility at Karaj.

On 09 March 2004 Alireza Jafarzadeh, who disclosed in August 2002 Iran's facilities at Natanz and Arak, said Iranian leaders decided at a recent meeting to seek an atom bomb "at all costs" and begin enriching uranium at secret plants. "They set a timetable to get a bomb by the end of 2005 at the latest," the former spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran said. "They will heavily rely on smaller secret enrichment sites at Karaj, Esfahan and at other places." Meysami Research Center

The Meysami Research Center principal activity is chemical agent detector & chemicals. The ND1 detector has been designed and produced in order to knowing the military forces from being the dangerous limit of environmental pollution to agents for just applying the personal protection accessories. Capabilities: Detection and alarming of an agent automatically; Detection of the other agents non-automatically; Allocation performance as to the agents.

Guard 1400-body guard spray is the production of defense industry organization-shahid Meysami research center and at present justintroducesto military forces and security authorities of country.with regarding to kind of its performance this spray has usage for personal defense against invader individual and its perfomance leads to that the invader person suffer from temporary srimulation of mucus and epiphora from his/her nose/eyes.the effective substance of this spray is OC or Oleo capsicum resin.

Products include chemicals (high purity – Laboratory services – Industrial research projects – Engineering design services. Tiophosphoril chloride(pscl3) is the production of the mentioned center too.

Meysami Research Center is situated in kilometer 27 of Karaj Special road. Its building stone is placed in 1985 by aiming to producing of research complex in order to scientific and technical supporting of country defense industry in the field of technology in chemistry industry.

The first phase was exploited by completing of building and equipping of synthesis, analysis and absorbing of first specialized personnel in 1987 and since that first time played a vital role in the field of assigned affairs due to present need and necessity, that it has continued up to now and has achieved to considerable ability and power by performing various researches projects as well as presenting of researches services in the field of synthesis and analysis of various materials and meanwhile in this direction, it secured research personnel, expert and completing of required equipments.

The second phase of center attached to activities chain and the affairs, which were in available for taking measure, by designing and building of work environment and also securing of equipment and the instruments which are allocated to pilot researches and by absorbing of considered expert group in order to developing of results and consequences of laboratorial researches in 1992

Producing phosphorous and its derivatives plays an important role in the present world, because of big quantities of phosphate rock and its comprehensive usage in kinds of industries in the country, it has a special importance in different industries. Meysami Research Center (M.R.C) MAHAM indutries is the only producer of white phosphorous and its derivatives in IRAN ,the process has been exploited and become abulk product by the maham parchin engineers under the observation of foreign experts. Maham Parchin industries capacity of producing phosphorous products covers the whole needs of the country for food grade phosphorous acid, red phosphorous, ferro phosphorous and phosphorous alloys. Producing Phosphotous products in maham parchin industries has caused other related industries and created vast job opportunities beside economizing a considerable foreign exchange in the country. All Phosphorous products in maham parchin industries are competitive and comparable with the same from other countries and they are presented to the market after different chemical / physical tests, also the quality confirmation by experienced experts.


Kolahdouz

The possible existence of a nuclear-related facility at this site was first reported on July 8, 2003, by the National Council of Resistance of Iran [NCRI], the political wing of the People's Mujahedeen; and organization listed by the US State Department as a terrorist organization.

Located about 14 kilometers west of Tehran, the plant is repotedly concealed within a large military complex. NIMA's only rendering of this name is Kolah Duz, but the name of this facility is also transliterated as Kolahdouz, Kolahdooz, or Kolahdoz.

For the production for the ground forces, the Defense Industry Organization [DIO] has devoted major resources within the framework of R&D on armored fighting vehicles (AFV and APC). For transport and support of troops, the "Boragh" APC was developed. Built by the Shahid Kolahdooz Industrial Complex division of the DIO, it is similar to Russian BMP-1 or its Chinese equivalent by NORINCO (WZ 501-Type 90), of which it improves certain characteristics.

According to the NCRI, the facility at Kolahdouz is dedicated to uranium enrichment. Centrifuge equipment located there is repotedly meant to operate as a supplement to the uranium enrichment site in Natanz, and with the experience gained there to be ultimately used at the larger facility at Natanz.

One facility is located near the Kolahdouz [Kolahduz sp?] complex, where a number of large warehouses and workshops for building tanks, armored personnel carriers and delicate mechanical parts are located. It is located at kilometer 14 of the Terhan-Karaj Highway, Shahriar exit, Kolahdouz complex.

This complex is affiliated with the Defense Industry Organization. The section that is related to the nuclear program is located near the riverbank, and is hidden among other warehouses in a way that would not draw attention. This indicates that not only the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran is involved in the nuclear weapons program, but also the Ministry of Defense is also involved in the nuclear weapons program.

This site covers about 4,000 square meters (nearly 40,000 square feet) in all area, 50 meters (150 ft) by 80 meters (260 ft). The centrifuge equipment installed here acts as a pilot facility. Reports indicate that Iran has obtained the needed material and they intend to do the testing of the centrifuge equipment to enrich uranium.

This site includes the clean [vacuum] environment in which the centrifuge equipment can best operate. This will eventually act as a supplement to the uranium enrichment site in Natanz. At this pilot facility, uranium will be enriched, the process will be perfected, and the experience will be used for the main uranium enrichment facility in Natanz.

The information about this site is top secret and the Iranian government has hidden this site among a number of buildings and workshops of the Kolahdouz Industrial Complex. This site is under the direct supervision of Dr. Ghaffarian, the head of the Defense Industry Organization.

Those working here are under very strict rules of information security. As a result the experts here are exposed to information only related to their own work. None of the employees are allowed to reveal any information as to the nature, location, and subject of their work with anybody outside the complex.

In late May 2003, Morteza Ostad Ali Mukhmalbaff, the head of the Intelligence Security of the Defense Industry Organization, and Brigadier General Mohammad Beig Mohammad Lou, Deputy Coordinator of the Defense Industry Organization (involved in the enrichment of uranium), hid a number of containers related to the pilot facility here in a warehouse about 2,000 square meters (20,000 square feet) with dimensions of 80 meters (260 feet) by 25 meters (80 feet). These containers are sealed and there has been a great emphasis that no one should know of the existence of these containers. This warehouse is surrounded by an auto junkyard, having other warehouses filled with wrecked cars. This warehouse is located at Martyred Kazemi complex of the Defense Industry Organization, next to the Kolahdouz complex.

A technical team of the IAEA visited Iran from 4 to 12 October 2003 in order to carry out activities related to the verification of Iran's activities in the areas of uranium conversion and laser and gas centrifuge enrichment. Following up on recent open source reports of enrichment activities being undertaken at the industrial complex in Kolahdouz in western Tehran, the team was permitted on 5 October 2003 to visit three locations which the Agency had identified as corresponding to those mentioned in the reports. While no work was seen at those locations that could be linked to uranium enrichment, environmental samples were taken.

The head of the Defense Industry Organization is Dr. Ghaffarian. The head of the Special Industry is Revolutionary Guards Brigadier General Gharmanesh and the head of the Kolahdouz complex is Revolutionary Guards Brigadier General Janad Rabbani.
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Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 8:33 am

Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 6



Esfahan / Isfahan
Nuclear Technology Center


Facilities

Miniature Neutron Source reactor (MNSR)
Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)
Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR)
Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor (GSCR)
Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL)
Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL)
Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)


Esfahan [Isfahan] is said to be the primary location of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The Nuclear Technology/Research Center in Esfahan is Iran's largest nuclear research center, and is said to employ as many as 3,000 scientists. Iran signed an agreement France in 1975 to build a nuclear research center in Isfahan, to provide training for personnel to operate the Bushehr reactor, located at the University of Isfahan. As of 1977 Iran reportedly planned to have at least one reactor and a small French-built fuel reprocessing facility in Isfahan by 1980.

The University of Isfahan, with over 50 years of experience, is one of the leading higher educational institutes in Iran. The university embraces seven faculties with thirty departments as well as an evening school. The University of Isfahan has a unique location at the foot of the Kuh Sofeh (Sofeh mountain) with an area of 4.5 million square meters. Over 1000 graduate students and 10,000 under-graduate students are trained in various fields of Science, Engineering, Human Science, Economics, Linguistics, Educational Science and Sport Science.

A facility associated with the Nuclear Technology/Research Center was reportedly opened in 1984, reportedly at a location about four kilometers outside the city and between the villages of Shahrida and Fulashans. The NIMA GEOnet Names Server (GNS) has no record of either populated place, nor of phonetically similar place names.

Facilities at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) include a Miniaturized Neutron Source Reactor [MNSR] research reactor of Chinese origin with a capacity of 27 kilowatt thermal (kWt). China and Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement on 21 January 1990 that reportedly included the construction of a 27 MW plutonium production reactor at Isfahan. In September 1991 American satellite imagery reportedly detected initial construction activities. The open literature is rather confused as to whether the facility in question was a new 27 MW reactor, or the 27 KW miniature neutron source. Preparatory steps were taken in the mid-1990s to bring the reactor on line, although the reactor remained incomplete as of 1997. A Chinese-supplied heavy-water, zero-power research reactor is also located at the Center. Other extensive construction activity is in progress at the center, although there contradictory reports as to whether the new buildings are designed for nuclear weapons technologies. Nuclear Facilities

The Nuclear Fuel Research & Production Center was founded in 1974 for scientific and technical support of country's comprehensive nuclear power plant program. At that time extensive site selection studies were made and present location, Roshandasht, 15Km southeast of Esfahan was selected. A number of activities were were performed before 1979 with consultancy of Technicatom of France. This included construction of temporary office buildings, establishment of temporary laboratories, and general site preparation including roads, water supply, electricity, etc. Design and preparation of preliminary drawings of workshops , laboratories and office buildings for the main site was completed, as was the fencing and design of green area forthe Center's site and protected zone.

During the period 1979-1981, due to policy change in country's NPP plans, the objective ofthe Center was reviewed and modified and its activities started at the temporary site in 1981. At present, Center has planned development of its capabilities in scientific and engineering abilities to establish industrial units related to Nuclear energy.

Between 1981 and mid-1993, Iran conducted a variety of small scale uranium conversion experiments which encompassed the conversion of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) to ammonium diuranate (ADU) and UO2, the conversion of UOC to ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC), the conversion of uranyl nitrate (UN) directly to UO3, the conversion of UO2 to UF4 through wet and dry processes and the conversion of UF4 to UF6. With the exception of the studies on uranium metal conversion and pulse columns, the small scale conversion activities started in the early to mid-1980s and continued for several years. The last of these, the UF4–UF6 experiments, ended in June of 1993. During the period 1995 to 2002, techniques to convert UF4 to uranium metal were developed and, during the period 1997 to 2002, research and development on processes in connection with the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan was also conducted.

Iran announced plans in 1995 to build a uranium hexafluoride (UF6) conversion plant at the Nuclear Technical Centre in Esfahan with Chinese assistance. During a November 1996 IAEA visit to Esfahan, Iran informed the IAEA Department of Safeguards that it planned to build a UF6 conversion plant. The UF6 plant was scheduled to open after 2000, but China claimed to have abandoned the project under pressure from the United States. Since Russia will supply the nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactors, Iran had no civil power plant requirement for uranium hexafluoride.

Construction at the site is said to include a hexafluoride plant being built with Chinese assistance. Other reports suggested that this facility may be located at the Rudan Nuclear Research Center in Fasa. Indications of the existence of this facility [wherever it may be located] included Russian press reports of a shipment of uranium hexafluoride gas from China to Iran in late 1994, as well as purchases of hydrogen fluoride from Germany and attempts to buy fluorification equipment from Britain.

China pledged in October 1997 to halt cooperation on a uranium conversion facility (UCF) and not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two nuclear projects: a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran will use to produce cladding for reactor fuel.

Chinese entities are continuing work on a Zirconium Production Facility at Esfahan that will enable Iran to produce cladding for reactor fuel. As an adherent to the NPT, Iran is required to accept IAEA safeguards on its nuclear material. The IAEA's Additional Protocol requires states to declare production of zirconium fuel cladding and gives the IAEA the right of access to resolve questions or inconsistencies related to the declarations, but prior to November 2003 Iran had made no moves to bring the Additional Protocol into force. Moreover, Iran remained the only NPT adherent with a full-scope safeguards agreement that has not adopted a subsidiary agreement obligating early declaration of nuclear facilities. Zirconium production, other than production of fuel cladding, is not subject to declaration or inspection.

A 05 May 2003 letter from Iran informed the agency for the first time of its plan to commence construction in 2003 of a Fuel Manufacturing Plant [FMP] at Isfahan. The stated purpose of the FMP is fabrication of fuel assemblies for the IR-40 and for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP).

The Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) is a facility declared to the IAEA in 2000 and currently under construction at Esfahan. In February 2003, before the top officials of the Ministry of Science, Iranian President Mohammad Khatanmi reportedly announced a program for a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which was to include the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Isfahan. At the UCF Facility in Isfahan, using the yellow cake prepared in the Ardekan, a number of by-products including uranium hexofloride (UF6), metallic uranium, and uranium oxide (Uo2) are produced. These are later used for uranium enrichment.

Accoring to Iran, in the early 1990’s, when the country decided to reconsider its nuclear program, it was not clear whether it will consist of CANDU reactors, Magnox reactors or light water reactors. Therefore it was decided to include a U-metal production line in the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) which could also be used to produce shielding material.

Iran has sought to obtain turnkey facilities, such as the UCF, that ostensibly would be used to support fuel production for the Bushehr power plant. But the UCF could be used in any number of ways to support fissile material production needed for a nuclear weapon—specifically, production of uranium hexafluoride for use as a feedstock for uranium enrichment operations and production of uranium compounds suitable for use as fuel in a plutonium production reactor.

In September 1995, China's ambassador to Iran admited that China was selling uranium enrichment technology to Iran, and in early 1996 China informed the IAEA of the proposed sale of a uranium conversion facility to Iran. The United States and China reached agreement in October 1997 that China would halt assistance to Iran's nuclear efforts. China pledged to halt cooperation on a uranium conversion facility (UCF) and to forego any new nuclear cooperation with Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two nuclear projects: a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran will use to produce cladding for reactor fuel. According to some reports, at that time the UCF plant was close to completion and was anticipated to be operational by 2000. Some reports suggest that by that time Chinese assistance had enabled Iran to complete construction of the UCF plant. In December 1998, US intelligence reports were publicly cited as having revealed that two Russian nuclear research institutes were actively negotiating to sell Iran a 40-megawatt heavy-water research reactor and a uranium-conversion facility.

On 10 February 2003 Gholamreza Aqazadeh, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, said that Iran had started an ambitious nuclear energy program and was poised to begin processing uranium. He said that the uranium ore processing plant should come on line soon in the central city of Isfahan and preliminary work had begun on a uranium enrichment plant. Aqazadeh said the first steps had been taken to build an enrichment plant, "but we still have a long way to go to have this plant come onstream." Aqazadeh said the enrichment plant would be built in Kashan [at Natanz] in central Iran. The fuel would come from another facility in Isfahan, where a Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was close to inauguration.

A much-anticipated report by the International Atomic Energy Agency, distributed to governments on 06 June 2003 in advance of a meeting of the agency's board of governors on 16 June 2003, has concluded that Iran had failed to comply with its nuclear safeguards agreement. The IAEA report revealed Iran is building a previously unacknowledged heavy-water research reactor. That facility could increase Iran's technological options for the production of nuclear weapons.

In the report Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General International Atomic Energy Agency [06 Jun 2003], the Director General identified a number of corrective actions by Iran which were necessary to enable the Agency to verify the previously unreported nuclear material declared to have been imported by Iran in 1991. These actions included the provision of design information on the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and the granting of access to that facility as well as to Anarak and Qom, where waste resulting from the processing of the imported material is stored or has been disposed of.

The Agency received preliminary design information on the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) under construction at ENTC in July 2000, and has been carrying out continuous design information verification (DIV) since then. In that design information, the facility was described as being intended for the conversion of uranium ore concentrate into UF6 for enrichment outside Iran, and for the subsequent conversion (at UCF) of the enriched UF6 into low enriched UO2 enriched uranium metal and depleted uranium metal.

In a letter to the Agency dated 9 October 2003 from Mr. E. Khalilipour, Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Iran provided information that had not been provided earlier on research activities carried out on uranium conversion processes, including acknowledgement of laboratory and bench scale experiments. Specifically, Iran confirmed that, between 1981 and 1993, it had carried out at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) bench scale preparation of UO2 and, at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC), bench scale preparation of ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC), UO3, UF4 and UF6. In the same letter, Iran further acknowledged that, contrary to its previous statements, practically all of the materials important to uranium conversion had been produced in laboratory and bench scale experiments (in kilogram quantities) between 1981 and 1993 without having been reported to the Agency. These activities were carried out at TNRC and ENTC.

In addition to the issues associated with the testing of UCF processes, the Agency had previously raised with Iran questions related to the purpose and use of nuclear material to be produced at UCF, such as uranium metal. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that the uranium metal had been intended not only for the production of shielding material, as previously stated, but also for use in the laser enrichment programme.

In the meetings held 27 October-1 November 2003, Iran provided additional information about these experiments. According to Iranian officials, the experiments took place between 1988 and 1992, and involved pressed or sintered UO2 pellets prepared at ENTC using depleted uranium that had been exempted from safeguards in 1978. The capsules containing the pellets had been irradiated in TRR in connection with a project to produce fission product isotopes of molybdenum, iodine and xenon. The plutonium separation was carried out at TNRC in three shielded glove boxes, which, according to Iran, were dismantled in 1992 and later stored in a warehouse at ENTC along with related equipment. Iran stated that these experiments had been carried out to learn about the nuclear fuel cycle, and to gain experience in reprocessing chemistry.

On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit all nuclear material accountancy reports, and design information for ENTC and JHL, covering these activities.

An IAEA Report dated Nov 10, 2003 found that Iran had failed to report the production of UO2 targets at ENTC and their irradiation in TRR, the subsequent processing of those targets, including the separation of plutonium, the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of unprocessed irradiated targets at TNRC. It also found that Iran had failed to provide design information for the facilities at ENTC and TNRC involved in the production of UO2, UO3, UF4, UF6 and AUC.

The UCF project is not one of the projects Iran agreed to suspend voluntarily. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was informed in February 2004 that Iran would start the Esfahan ICF project in March 2004. In early 2004 Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) Director Reza Aqazadeh announced that the Esfahan UCF project was in the experimental stage and that the center would soon begin experimental production. He stated that the Esfahan UCF center would produce all the raw materials needed for fuel cycle activities, including hexafluoride uranium, metal uranium, and uranium oxide.

On 09 March 2004 Alireza Jafarzadeh, who disclosed in August 2002 Iran's facilities at Natanz and Arak, said Iranian leaders decided at a recent meeting to seek an atom bomb "at all costs" and begin enriching uranium at secret plants. "They set a timetable to get a bomb by the end of 2005 at the latest," the former spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran said. "They will heavily rely on smaller secret enrichment sites at Karaj, Esfahan and at other places."

On 12 June 2004 Iran rejected European demands that it freeze additional parts of its atomic program, including the heavy-water reactor. "We will not accept any new obligation," Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said at a news conference. "If anyone asks us to give up Isfahan industries to change yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas or to give up heavy-water facilities in Arak, we cannot accept such an extra demand that is contradictory to our legal rights."

Iran informed the Agency that it was conducting hot tests at UCF that would generate UF6 product. One such test, which generated about 30–35 kg UF6, was conducted between May and June 2004. In March 2004, Iran began testing the process lines involving the conversion of UOC into UO2 and UF4, and UF4 into UF6. As of June 2004, 40 to 45 kg of UF6 had been produced therefrom. A larger test, involving the conversion of 37 t of yellowcake into UF4, was initiated in August 2004.

On 18 June 2004 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopted a resolution submitted by France, Germany and Britain, that called on Iran to freeze the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak and the conversion of uranium in Isfahan.

On 19 September 2004 the IAEA board of governors adopted a resolution Saturday that it was necessary for Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities immediately. Iran promised before to comply but has only partially suspended its uranium enrichment program and never for very long.

On 21 September 2004 Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency that it had started converting uranium into the gas needed for enrichment purposes, a process that has sparked renewed concerns about a possible bomb program. Reza Aghazadeh, Iran's Vice-President and energy chief said the Islamic Republic is already converting part a large amount of raw uranium into the gas (hexafluoride) used by nuclear centrifuges to make enriched uranium. This larger test involving 37 tonnes of yellowcake had been planned for August/September 2004. If all 37 tonnes of yellowcake were converted, that could produce enough uranium metal that, when enriched, would yield abou 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium -- enough to make up to five atomic bombs.

According to Iran’s declaration of 14 October 2004, 22.5 t of the 37 t of yellowcake had been fed into the process and that approximately 2 t of UF4, and 17.5 t of uranium as intermediate products and waste, had been produced. There was no indication as of that date of UF6 having been produced during this later campaign.

On 01 August 2005 Iran handed over an official letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) informing the international nuclear watchdog that it would resume activities at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan.

Missile, Chemical and Other Military ProgramsEsfahan is also reportedly the site of Iran’s largest missile assembly and production plant. This ballistic missile production facility, built with North Korean assistance, is said to be capable of producing liquid propellants and missile structural components. According to reports published in Russia, apparently based on information developed by the Russian Federal Security Service, Esfahan is involved in the production of Scud-B and Scud-C surface-to-surface missiles by assembling components bought in North Korea and China. According to the 1995 Jane's Intelligence Review - Special Report No. 6 on Iran's weapons, North Korea helped build a "Scud Mod B" (320 km/1000 kg) assembly plant in Iran in 1988, but the plant apparently never manufactured any missiles. North Korea aided Iran in converting a missile maintenance facility into an assembly plant for the Scud Mod Cs. Other activities at this facility are reported to include R&D on unguided missiles and production of missile frames.

Esfahan is said to be one of Iran's major chemical weapons facilities, along with the facilities located at Damghan [the primary production facility], Parchin and Qazvin. Iran continues to upgrade and expand its chemical warfare production infrastructure and munitions arsenal, which includes blister, blood, choking agents, and nerve agents.

The Esfahan area is a major center for Iran's advanced defense industry, with plants for munition productions, tank overhaul, and helicopter and fixed wing aircraft maintenance. The main operational facilities for the army's aviation units are located at Esfahan, presumably at Khatamin Air Base northeast of the city. City of Isfahan

Standing 1570 meters above sea level, Isfahan is 415 Km south of Tehran. This world-famous city with many historical buildings, bridges and eye-catching places, is one of the most significant tourist attractions in Iran, so that almost all tourists visiting Iran go on a visit to Isfahan. Dating back to circa 2500 years ago, Isfahan has been the capital of Iran in three historical periods. The golden age of Isfahan was in the Safavid era (1501 - 1736).

Enjoying ancient monuments with magnificent architecture and eye-pleasing tilework on the one hand, and beautiful handicrafts on the other, Isfahan attracts a large number of tourists interested in the Iranian art and history. The Imam Mosque is situated to the south of Naqsh-e-Jahan sq. Built in the reign of Shah Abbas, tilework and architecture of this mosque are amazingly superb. Its minarets are 48 meters high.

Situated to the west of Naqsh-e-Jahan sq, the Ali Qapoo Palace belongs to the Safavid period. It was used for the reception of the ambassadors and envoys from other countries. Ã li Qapoo is a six storeyed building with numerous rooms, the plasterwork and paintings of which are extremely impressive. The Chehel Sotoon Palace is another building dating back to the Safavid period, builtamidst a vast garden covering an area of 67000 sq m. The building has a veranda with 18 pillars and a large pool in front of it. Being mirrored in the still water of the pool, the pillars create a beautiful view. The wall-paintings in the interior of the building are superlative in their kind.

Being unique in architecture and construction, the Si-o-Se Pol Bridge has thirty three arches through which the Zayandeh Rood river passes. It was built in the reign of Shah Abbas. The Chahar Bagh School was built during the rule of Shah Sultan Hoseyn for theology students. Its beautiful dome is an architectural triumph. Built in the reign of Shah Abbas, Vank Church is the most famous church in Iran. It contains numerous paintings with religious themes.

On the banks of Zayandeh Rood passing through the city, there are parks of Boostan and Mellat. These verdant parks, in harmony with the ancient bridges of Khajoo and Si-o-Se pol create pleasant views. There are many other sights in Isfahan. The following are some of them displaying extraordinary qualities of art: Kakh-e-Hasht Behesht (the palace of eight paradises), Monar Jonban (the moving minaret), Jame'mosque and the mausoleum of Khajeh Nezam-ol-Molk's.
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Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 8:37 am

Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 7



Natanz [Kashan]

During a press conference by the representative office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran held in Washington DC, in mid-August 2002, the existence of a secret nuclear facility at Natanz was revealed. Israeli military intelligence refers to the site as "Kashan."

Natanz is located between Isfahan and Kashan in central Iran. The facility is reportedly 100 miles north of Esfahan, and is located in old Kashan-Natanz, near a village called Deh-Zireh, itself located about 25 miles southeast of Kashan, and falls under the jurisdiction of the Governor's Office of Kashan.

Officially a project aimed at the eradication of deserts, construction on the facility was said to have begun in 2000 and was being carried out by the Jahad-e Towse'eh and Towese'eh-Sakhteman construction companies. As of mid-2002, construction was not due to be completed until 2003, at which point, installation of the technical facilities would begin.

According to the NCRI, as of August 2002, the project had cost 95 billion toumans. Funding had been provided by the Supreme Security Council and was outside of the supervisory purview of the Budget and Planning Organization. A front company had specifically been created for project. Named Kala-Electric, whose headquarters are located in Tehran, meets all requirements for the project's facilities and equipment and is run by Davood Aqajani, who is also the managing director for the Natanz heavy water project. Officials from the company have reportedly made a number of trips to both China and India in 2001. The head of Atomic Enery Agency of Iran, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, reportedly pays visits to the site every months in order to oversee progress on the facility.

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) on 12 December 2002 released an issue brief expressing concern that Iran is trying to develop "the capability to make separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the two main nuclear explosive materials." ISIS acquired satellite imagery of a site in Natanz, about 40 kilometers southeast of Kashan, which may be a gas-centrifuge facility for uranium enrichment.

Iran strongly rejected the allegations and reiterated that the two plants were intended to generate electricity. "In the next 20 years, Iran has to produce 6,000 megawatts of electricity by nuclear plants and the launch of these two centers are aimed at producing necessary fuel for these plants," Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said.

Tehran later invited the International Atomic Energy Agency to travel to Iran to inspect both facilities, which has been accepted. "We have been in contacts with the IAEA over these two centers and we will officially invite them for inspections since the agency must inspect them and carry out their necessary planning and supervision before the centers are put into operation," Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said.

On 10 February 2003 Gholamreza Aqazadeh, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, said that Iran had started an ambitious nuclear energy program and was poised to begin processing uranium. He said that the uranium ore processing plant should come on line soon in the central city of Isfahan and preliminary work had begun on a uranium enrichment plant. Aqazadeh said the first steps had been taken to build an enrichment plant, "but we still have a long way to go to have this plant come onstream." Aqazadeh said the enrichment plant would be built in Kashan [at Natanz] in central Iran. The fuel would come from another facility in Isfahan, where a Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was close to inauguration.

The UN's International Atomic Energy Agency's inspectors visited Iran on 21 February 2003 to look at nuclear facilities under construction there. "We will be looking at facilities not even completed yet that are not formally under safeguards," as chief IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky puts it. The visit is the first step in a process of many visits to understand the architecture of the place and to design the most effective monitoring regime for that facility." American officials believe new nuclear facilities in Iran could be used to make nuclear weapons.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei visited the site on 21 February, in the first visit by the U.N.-chartered nuclear monitoring agency. During this visit, the Director General was informed by Iran of its uranium enrichment plant (PFEP) nearing completion of construction, and a large commercial-scale fuel enrichment plant (FEP) also under construction.

It was reported on August 26, 2003, that the IAEA had found particles of highly enriched uranium in environmental samples taken at Natanz. These findings were released in a report whose distribution was initially restricted to the organization's 35-nation Board of Governors.

During the discussions which took place in August 2004, Iran repeated that, although the design drawings of a P-2 centrifuge had been acquired in 1995, no work on P-2 centrifuges was carried out until early 2002 when, according to Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) management decided that “work on a modified P-2 machine based on a sub-critical rotor design would not hurt,â€
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Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 8:39 am

Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 8



Saghand [Sagend]
32°28'45"N 55°24'30"E


In February 2003, Iran announced that it had begun mining uranium deposits at Saghand near the central Iranian city of Yazd, and was constructing a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, located 200 miles southeast of Tehran.

The Saghand [Sagend] uranium ore deposit in Yazd covers 100-150 square kilometers, with reserves estimated at 3,000-5,000 tons of uranium oxide. As of the mid-90s exploratory and preparatory work was in progress at the deposit, though exploitation and extraction work had not begun.

A production plant for processing the uranium ore into concentrate is reportedly planned for the area. In October 1989 Iran announced plans to build a uranium milling plant near the Saghand mine. The Argentine National Institute for Applied Research, INVAP, signed an $18 million contract to build a series of unsafeguarded facilities for processing uranium ore, although Argentina announced in January 1992 that it was withdrawing from the project under US pressure. China may have subsequently contributed to completing this plant.

Iran has denied unconfirmed reports that underground mines in the vicinity are being used for detonation testing associated with nuclear weapons development.

Mohammad Ghannadi-Maragheh, Vice President for Nuclear Fuel Production of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), discussed the project at the World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium held in London 3-5 September 2003. The mine project is located 185 km north-east of Yazd, and covers an area of 20 hectares. The exploration completed in 1994 concentrated on areas, and resulted in a calculated reserve of 1.58 million metric tonnes of uranium ore with an average grade of 533 ppm (0.0533% U). This translates into a total uranium contents of 842 metric tonnes. The underground mine will have two shafts, each 350 meters deep. Ores with grades above 300 ppm will be sent to the uranium mill, while ores with grades between 100 and 300 ppm will be exploited by heap leaching.

After accomplishment of geological and exploratory operation and preparation of preliminary and detailed designs, mine development is under operation and was expected to be finished by the end of 2004. After development stage, which meant opening the mine, exploitation activities will be started. The lifetime of mine from the beginning of year 2005 with a capacity of 120,000 tons of ore to be as yearly production is anticipated 17 years.

Saghand uranium mines are located in northeast of Yazd province, in central Iran desert (Kavir). This area has a dry weather and humidity is too low. In summer, the weather is very hot and in the winter it is cold, so that the maximum temperature in the summer goes up to 45ºC and in the winter decreases to -15ºC.

In deposit No. 2 mineralization is formed at the interval between 270m to 400m depth in lensoid bodies with the slope of 5-30 degree. The plan dimensions of this deposit are 300 by 400 meters. Ore reserve of this deposit according to two categories of C and D is estimated as 1,398,000 tons with the average grade of 562 ppm. mineralization in deposit No. 1 begins from the ground level in the form of dispersed lenses with the slopes of 50-70 degrees to the depth of 16 meters. The plan dimensions of this deposit are 200 by 300 meters. Ore reserve of this deposit according to two categories of C and D is calculated as 152,000 tons with the average grade of 459 ppm.

Accessing to the ore bodies will be possible through to shafts (the main and ventilation shafts) with 4 meters in diameter, which are situated at the south of deposit No. 2 down to depth of 350 meters. At the depth of 100m, a tunnel connecting the two deposits will be excavated with the length of 700 meters. A 700 meters tunnel will be cut to connect these two shafts to the deposit No. 1 in the deposit No.2 exploration will be done using for levels which are connected to two shafts the mining methods used to mine the deposit No.2 are called room and pillar, cut and fill, sub level stopping. Mining methods used to mine deposit No.1 is a mixture of open pit and under lower levels will be exploited using a connecting tunnel between deposits No.1 and 2 at the level of 100m by under ground mining procedures.

Exploratory activities in Saghand area started after victory of Islamic revolution by using the information resulted from geographical air borne surveys. Until the end of 1989 most of those activation were in the stage of preliminary exploration and overall in area extending to 200 hectares. Detail of exploration: From the beginning of 1990 detail exploration works started and priority was given to the area covering anomalies No. 1 and 2 due to a better perspective from ore reserve point of view. Finally in the limited area of the two anomalies with the dimensions of (300 by 400m) and (200 by 300m) respectively detail exploratory works were performed.

In detail exploration stage, 600 Iranian and Chinese experts worked to yield totally 104 reports in different related fields such as: performing 10786m drilling, 18737m logging using 12 different elements, 214 sheet of maps. With a variety of scales, 21217m well is washing. Petrographical and geochmical studies Trench digging and so on. At the end, by using information from the above activities, logging procedures performed by geophysical group of ELG company of Hungary and lithological logs prepared by Iranian and Chinese experts ore reserve calculation was performed for the space between ground level to the depth of 350m according to the results obtained from exploration activities technical and economical evalutions and also preliminary and detail technical designs were performed yielding more than 4000 maps and 135 volumes of reports.
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Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 8:46 am

Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 9



Tehran

Facilities
Tehran's Vicinity


Hemmat Industrial Complex
Tehran Nuclear Research Center
Kalaye Electric Company
Lavizan, Tehran
Modern Defensive Readiness and Technology Center


Iran's main missile program office is located in the south-western suburbs of Teheran. According to reports published in Russia, apparently based on information developed by the Russian Federal Security Service, other facilities in Tehran are involved in R&D and production of unguided missiles.

The research program of the Tehran-based Center for Theoretical Physics and Mathematics of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) includes theoretical physics, and other R&D related to high energy physics, including particle physics, mathematical physics, astrophysics, theoretical nuclear physics, statistical mechanics, theoretical plasma physics, and mathematics.


Chalus

Chalus has been reported as the locale of an underground nuclear weapons developoment facility located inside a mountain south of this coastal town. The facility has been variously reported as being staffed by experts from Russia, China and North Korea.


Darkhovin

Darkhovin, also variously referred to as Ahvaz, Darkhouin, Esteghlal, and Karun, is located on the Karun River south of the city of Ahvaz. A facility at this location is reportedly under the control of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, and is said to be suspected of being an underground nuclear weapons facility of unspecified nature. The most detailed and apparently least reliable reports of Iran’s weapons programs are from the People's Mujahideen, a violent anti-regime group, including the claim that China provided uranium enrichment equipment and technicians for the facility.

In 1974, Iran signed a contract with the French company Framatome for two 950 MW pressurized water reactors (PWRs) to be built at a site called Karun. Although site preparations had begun, construction was canceled by Iran following the Islamic revolution in 1979.

In 1993, Iran contracted with China to build two 300 MWe Qinshan PWRs, under a project called Esteghlal ("Independence"). The project was originally planned to achieve operational status by 2005. China reportedly conducted seismic surveys at the site, and received initial payments for the construction work. Subsequently the United States persuaded China to cancel the reactor agreement, which remains in abeyance due to Iran's inability to pay for continued work. However, China announced on 27 September 1995 that it intended to cancel construction of the reactors. There is no small confusion in the literature concerning the location of this project, which some sources assert [evidently incorrectly] was to be located at "Esteghlal" near Bushehr.

On 10 December 2005 the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Agency Organization (IAEA), Gholam-Reza Aqazadeh, announced the start of construction of a 360mw nuclear power plant using domestic-made fueld started in southwestern Khuzestan province "All components of the power plant will be constructed in Darkhoein city in Khuzestan province by Iranian experts who are highly qualified.... Materialization of the plant will count on the experience gained by the Islamic Republic from the construction of a 40mw research reactor in (the central city of) Arak," he said. He said construction of the power plant had the approval of the cabinet, adding that funds for the purpose has been appropriated and and released.


Tabas

Tabas has been reported as a possible site of a nuclear reactor of North Korean orgin. This claim remains unconfirmed in subsequent reporting, and is probably unfounded speculation.


Uranium Mines

Since 1988, Iran has reportedly opened as many as 10 uranium mines, including the Saghand uranium mine in Yazd province, as well otherwise unspecified locations in Khorassan, Sistan va Baluchestan, and Hormozgan Provinces, and in Bandar-e-Abbas and Badar-e-Lengeh Provinces along the Gulf. The Director of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, Reza Amrollahi, announced in 1989 that the expected reserves of these deposts was in excess of 5,000 tons.

Uranium resources of Iran are not considered rich. The results of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) exploration activities have shown proven reserves of about 3,000 tons of Uranium so far. According to the discovered indices (more than 350 anomalies) and the results of the field discoveries, the expected resources of Iran could be at the range of 20,000-30,000 tons of U3O8, throughout the country. Therefore Iran's domestic reserves might be sufficient enough to supply the raw material for needed nuclear power plants in future.

A few groups had attempted to evaluate the potential of uranium resources in different geological environment by general reconnaissance in Iran Before formal establishment of Uranium Exploration and Mining Affairs by AEOI in 1974. In 1935 Dr. Mohammad Monnajemi, was the first one who tried to define radiation and uranium on different ore samples of Anarak ore district. He reported that some ore samples of Kali-Kafi were radioactive. During 1959-1960 the Sarcia Mission from CEA, France and Geological survey of Iran (GSI) did preliminary investigation for uranium resources in Anarak, Khorasan, Central Iran and Azarbaijan. During 1969-1971 CEA and GSI did reconnaissance for different parts of country by using of scintilometer, helicopter, and car for field surveying. The survey was not directly oriented to study the relationship between crystalline rock units (as original uranium source - rock and associated sedimentary formations (host - rocks)). Besides a general reconnaissance by helicopter, open profiles (2.5 - 8km) for sedimentary and 1 km for granitic massifs were also carried out. The final recommendation of CEA mission was emphasized on sedimentary and crystalline rock areas. UNDP advisor Dr. France R. Joubin in 1974 summarized world wide deposits and with respect to some of them he concluded that: 1 PE conglomeratic-type do not have much possibilities to be formed; 2 Sandstone-type are also not very probable to be found in Iran; 3 - vein-type deposits and possible pegmatitic-type seemed most promising.

AEOI has authorized systematic exploration for Uranium using high Technique methods for uranium prospecting in whole country since 1974. The basic philosophy in this approach are to locate radioactive anomalies, and mineralization for finding economic ore bodies, and the efficient use of new geosciences and technologies for reducing low potential areas, and specify areas of interest. The first stage of airborne surveying was performed by Uriran and it’s contractors (Prakla Seismoss, Austirex, and C.G.G.) covering about 600,000 km2 by using of airplane and helicopter during 1976-1978.

Parallel with airborne surveying prospecting groups have done ground surveying, using radiometry, geology and geochemistry and drilling methods to define prospective locations. This stage of prospecting was ended collecting airborne radiometry, K, U, Th - spectrometry, magnetic data on the forms of digital and analogue formats, as well as discovering of uranium and thorium prospects on different geological environments.

Since 1979, Exploration and Mining Affairs has followed exploration program to evaluate uranium resources of the country by processing of airborne data and producing hardcopies and geophysical maps in 1:50000, and 1:250000 scales and the interpretation and ground controlling of recommended areas. Prospecting and detailed exploration in radioactive anomalous fields have applied different methods of ground exploration. Based on the results of exploration and research projects it was concluded that the most promising geological environments hosting uranium resources are: Pan-African tectono-Magmatic activated zones in central Iran for metasomatic-hydrothermal types deposits; Alpine reactivated terrance for magmatic-hydrothermal types of uranium associated with base-metals; and Intermountain basins of Alpine-Himalayan folded Belt for sedimentary hosting resources. At present Exploration of uranium is in progress using new technologies and multi-sourced data.


A Covert Reactor?

Does Iran have a plutonium production reactor, covertly hidden in some magic mountain unseen by outsiders? Or are the overt facilities the sum of Iran's program? In this provocative analysis, Mark Gubrud concludes that while Iran could hide a reactor, it probably has not. Construction of the heavy water plant at Arak is five years ahead of reactor construction because it take five years of heavy water production to accumulate sufficient heavy water for the reactor.

A plutonium production reactor similar in size to the existing reactor at Yongbyon in North Korea or the one that Iran has declared its intent to construct at Arak (adjacent to the existing heavy water plant that would appear to be intended for providing D2O needed by such a reactor) would be expected to produce some 20-40 MW of waste heat that could not be efficiently converted into electrical power and would have to be disposed of somehow.

A conventional assumption would be that the infrared signature of this waste heat would be readily observable by satellite and therefore such a reactor could not be operated covertly. This would indeed be the case if the heat were to be dissipated by conventional means such as a single large cooling tower or by discharging hot water into a nearby river at a single point. However, any analysis of the potential for covert construction (underground or disguised as another type of facility) and operation of a plutonium-production reactor would have to consider the possibility that unconventional means could be used to hide or disguise the waste heat.

Covert construction and operation would significantly complicate and increase the cost of such a project, and would expose the facility to critical security risks if security measures that would normally be taken were forgone in order to avoid raising suspicions as to its true nature. Besides the heat release, there are additional signatures of reactor operation and plutonium separation, such as the release of particular isotopes as gases, contaminants of the reactor secondary coolant, or wastes from the chemical separation process, that could be difficult to fully control. However, the heat signature should not be impossible to conceal.

A typical large electrical generating plant may dissipate thousands of MW of waste heat, and typical oil refineries and large-scale chemical processing plants may dissipate hundreds of MW. Therefore it should not be difficult to hide an additional 20-40 MW of wate heat in the thermal budget of such a facility if the reactor were located nearby. The additional heat from the reactor could either be used in the existing process or inserted into the waste heat stream from the process, cutting back its operating level if necessary.

The heavy water plant at Arak is reportedly to use the Girdler sulphide process. Canadian plants using this process required approximately 33 TJ of steam heat at moderate temperature (130 C) per metric ton of D2O produced [SOURCE]. The Arak plant is to have an initial capacity of 8 t/yr. Therefore the Arak plant alone could dispose of around 10 MW and could be combined with another disposal method, or perhaps a covert reactor may be smaller (and it may be difficult to do calorimetry within a factor of 2 by remote observation).

Controlling the thermal signature from the reactor itself and from steam piping carrying the heat away from the reactor to the disposal site would require a combination of insulation and active cooling with careful temperature regulation, but this would be feasible if the distance were not too great.

Other possibilities for disposing of the waste heat would include evaporation of water into ambient dry air, not in a conventional cooling tower but perhaps at many points in open country or in a single large building vented horizontally; discharge into a nearby river at many points up- and downstream (this method could also be used to disguise a somewhat elevated waste heat output); discharge into an underground river or aquifer; or injection of steam into a deep well as is done conventionally to improve recovery in old oilfields.

The principal difficulty with such scenarios would be the risk of detection either by surveillance during construction, or during operation due to an accident, or at any point due to a breach of security or detection of some signature by technical means. Refusal of a demand for on-site inspection might be taken as prima facie evidence of a clandestine facility. It may be implausible or excessively risky, as well as undermotivated, for Iran to undertake such a large and complicated project and try to keep it secret from Israeli, American and allied intelligence agencies, but that is more difficult to assess on a purely technical basis.

Iran's nearly-operational D2O production line at Arak and announced plans for an isotope prodcution reactor to begin construction this year at an adjacent site follow a logical sequence. The IR-40 reactor is expected to need 80-90 t of D2O to get started, 5 yrs. production at Arak once its capapcity is doubled, although Iran must have other stocks of D2O that can contribute. Once the reactor is online, part of its heat output can be used to support the D2O plant, whose output will then exceed the operating needs of the reactor, but could fuel further ambitions.

In conclusion, a covert reactor cannot be ruled out on the basis of the heat signature alone. However, such a reactor seems unlikely, particularly at Arak where a declared reactor is to be built and will be subject to inspection (while also giving Iran an option to openly break out of safeguards and produce Pu). Challenge inspections at Arak would likely reveal any provisions for a covert reactor to be used as a steam source, and under inspections it would be difficult to hide the reactor, even underground, since there would need to be access for moving large pieces of equipment in and out. The D2O facility alone is not subject to IAEA inspections, but the declared reactor would be.
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Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 8:58 am

Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 10



Iran's Nuclear-Related Sites

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Article
http://cns.miis.edu/research/iran/nucsites.htm

Iran's Nuclear Sites
Click to view (photo too large to display, it will stretch the page)
http://cns.miis.edu/research/iran/images/mapbig.gif
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http://cns.miis.edu/research/iran/nucsites.htm


Natanz Satellite Photos:
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Bushehr Satellite Photos:
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Arak
Location: Central Iran
Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40)

The Arak facility is a heavy water production plant located 150 miles south of Tehran. As of mid-August 2002, this site was 85% complete. Heavy water production plants are not covered by comprehensive IAEA safeguard agreements. The Arak facility also contains a 40 MW IR-40, construction of which is planned to start in 2004.


Natanz
Location: Approximately 200 miles south of Tehran
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) Natanz is a pilot plant located approximately 200 miles south of Tehran that is under construction and hosts about 200 operational gas centrifuges. A gas centrifuge is one of the primary methods used in the process of uranium enrichment. The plant has two facilities, a pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) and a large-scale commercial scale fuel enrichment plant (FEP).


Bushehr
Location: Southern Iran (port city)
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) A 1000 MW nuclear power reactor in southwestern Iran that is due to become operational in the second half of 2004. In 1995, Russia and Iran signed an $800 million contract under which the former would provide the latter with a light water reactor at the Bushehr site.


Tehran
Location: Northeast Iran Iran's main missile program office is located in the south-western suburbs of Teheran. The Tehran facility contains the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility), and the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL).


Other Iranian Facilities
Tehran facility
Location: North Central Iran in Tehran

The Tehran facility holds the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), a Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility), and the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL). The previously undeclared Jabr Ibn Hayan laboratory "now stores UF6 (1000 kg), UF4 (400 kg) and UO2 (400 kg)."[1] Iran also informed the IAEA that "it had converted most of the UF4 into uranium metal in 2000 at JHL. This information was subsequently confirmed by Iran in a separate letter to the Agency dated 26 February 2003." [2]

[1] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General. IAEA Gov/2003/40. 6 June 2003.
[2] Ibid.


Esfahan facility
Location: Central Iran The Esfahan facility is a Nuclear Technology/Research Center facility that contains the following reactors and facilities: Miniature Neutron Source reactor (MNSR); Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR); Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR); Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL); Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL); Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF); Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor, decommissioned (GSCR); and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP). This facility was constructed in terms of separate agreements with France (nuclear research) and China (construction of a 27 MW plutonium production reactor). The IAEA raised questions concerning the UO2, UF4 and UF6 production at the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in February of 2003.
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Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 9:05 am

Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 11



Interesting Photos

Nuclear Speeches!

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Postby Ahreeman X » Wed Apr 19, 2006 9:15 am

Iran's Nuclear Sites
part 12



Iran's key nuclear sites
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4617398.stm

With international concerns running high over Iran's nuclear programme, use the map below to find out more about its key nuclear facilities.

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BUSHEHR - Nuclear power station
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The Bushehr nuclear power station (image: DigitalGlobe)

Iran's nuclear programme began in 1974 with plans to build a nuclear power station at Bushehr with German assistance.

The project was abandoned because of the Islamic revolution five years later, but revived in 1992 when Tehran signed an agreement with Russia to resume work at the site.

There are two pressurised water reactors at the site - one reportedly near completion.


ISFAHAN - Uranium conversion plant
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Isfahan uranium conversion plant

Iran is building a plant here to convert uranium ore into three forms:

Hexafluoride gas - used in gas centrifuges
Uranium oxide - used to fuel reactors, albeit not the type Iran is constructing
Metal - often used in the cores of nuclear bombs. The IAEA is concerned about the metal's use, as Iran's reactors do not require it as fuel.


NATANZ - Uranium enrichment plant
A recent satellite image of the Natanz site

Iran suspended work on an uranium enrichment plant at Natanz in 2003 - but has recently reopened the facility.

In 2003, a leaked International Atomic Energy Agency report said that weapons-grade uranium had been found in samples taken from the site, although Iran blamed contaminated imported equipment, and an independent report later confirmed this.

According to some estimates, when complete, Natanz could house some 50,000 advanced gas centrifuges, which would produce enough weapons-grade uranium to produce more than 20 weapons per year.

Other estimates suggest the plant will have a total of 5,000 centrifuges when initial stages of the project are completed. With that number, Iran would be able to produce sufficient enriched uranium to make a small number of nuclear weapons each year.


ARAK - Heavy water plant
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The Arak plant in 2002 (image: DigitalGlobe)

The apparent existence of a heavy water facility near the town of Arak first emerged with the publication of satellite images by the US-based Institute for Science and International Security in December 2002.

Heavy water is used to moderate the nuclear fission chain reaction either in a certain type of reactor - albeit not the type that Iran is currently building - or produce plutonium for use in a nuclear bomb.

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