Mission for my country- by: Shahanshah Aryamehr

Pahlavi and after (1925 AD - present)

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Mission for my country- by: Shahanshah Aryamehr

Postby Liberator » Sun Jan 30, 2005 3:47 pm

Mission for my country

His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
Shahanshah of Iran

Hutchinson & Co Ltd

I've recently purchased this book and am looking forward to read it. I will do my best to provide exerpts and thoughts as I did on Empress Farah Pahlavi's book "An Enduring Love: My Life with the Shah".
As i'm sure many of our other readers have read this historical book written by our late Shah it would be nice hearing your thoughts about it as well. I'm sure our dear compatriot Oldman will be able to give us good feedback on it. Now let me get on with the book ;)

Forgive me for any spelling mistakes that I might have done in the process of copying these passages from the book, unfortunately I don't have enough time to go abck and proof-read what i've written up once again but I've done my best to avoid any such spelling errors.

Ba Sepaas
Last edited by Liberator on Fri Mar 10, 2006 8:08 pm, edited 2 times in total.
"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable" -J.F.K
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Postby Liberator » Sun Jan 30, 2005 3:48 pm

Shahanshah Aryamehr on his father Reza Shah the Great:

Chapter 2 pgs 29-44

...At that time [My note: 14 year old and recently joined Persian Cossack Brigade] he was completely illiterate, for in those days education in Persia was the monopoly of the leisured classes and of the clergy, who kept this privilege to themselves, preventing spreading it among the common people. They intended the public to remain in ignorance, so that they themselves might do whatever they wished.

Describing his father:

Broad-shouldered and tall, he had prominent and rugged features, but it was his piercing eyes that arrested anybody who met him. Those eyes could make a strong man shrivel up inside. I have been told that the Russian officers in command of the Persian Cossack Brigade were in awe of him, perhaps actually frightened of him.

On his father's illiteracy:

One thing that helped my father forge ahead was his habit of study. As a grown man he felt no shame in starting from the beginning. Each day at the end of his army duties, he would sit patiently at his studies in his barracks, learning to read and write with the help of one of his friends.

Talks quite a good deal about the horrific situation Iran/Persia found itself during the Qajar era! "people festered with poverty, illiteracy, ignorance, and lack of hygiene. They were consumed with frustration, discontent, and misery". The corruption, economic mismanagement and all the other policies of the qajars that literally ruined Persia are also listed and discussed.

Comparing Persias's situation with that of Turkey's during that era:

It is interesting to compare our situation in those days with that of neighbouring Turkey, which my father visited in 1934 to observe remarkable progress made and to strengthen the political and cultural ties between the two countries. At the time the caliphate fell, the Turks, being nearer to the West and in constant contact with it, had travelled much farther along the road to Westernization than we. They had an established army on German lines, military academies, and arsenals, and cadres of well-trained officers; and in the First World War they fought bravely and often victoriously facing the best armies the Allies could put against them. In contrast with our own feudalistic system in the days before my father took over, the Turks had a strong central government that actualyl controlled the country. They possessed railways, ports, factories, and other appurtenances of modern civilization, whereas we had almost no such facilities. Clearly we had much farther to go.

On the country name-change:

My father even decreed that in all foreign relations, Persia should be known only as Iran. I remember that during the Second World War Winston Churchill told me, grumpily but with a twinkle in his eye, that he, Churchill, would never be intimidated into speaking of Persia in any way except Persia. Recently, in a response to a petition from a group of our statesmen and scholars, I have approved the use of both names interchangeably for all purposes.

"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable" -J.F.K
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Postby Liberator » Sun Jan 30, 2005 3:48 pm

Chapter 3 pgs 45-58

On his father Reza Shah the Great:

Everybody, even among his enemies, agreed that my father possessed a most amazing personality. He could be one of the pleasantest men in the world, yet he could be one of the most frightening. As I have alreayd said, strong men often trembled just to look at him. He had an almost devastating ability to assess human nature. As though he possessed some secret electronic ray, he could amlost instantly size up a man's strengths or weaknesses, his integrity or his slipperiness. No wonder many men feared to look him in the eye.
Yet contrary to what many believed, my father was kind and tender-hearted especially towards his family. His forbidding sternness seemed to melt into love, kindness, and easy familiarity when he was with us.

Reza Shah was indeed a servant of his nation. He led a simple life devoted to his country; waking up 5 a.m. and retired to bed at 10 p.m.

On his father's simple life:

Especially remarkable was his simplicity of taste and of personal conduct. Many a self-made man tries to impress others with an ostentatious display of material wealth. Moreover, Oriental monarchs have not generally been known for the simplicity of their habits. But my father proudly shunned the Qajar tradition of lavish luxury.
Even after he became Emperor, he usually wore a simple army uniform tailored in the Russian Cossack style. His hime-made stockings were not of very good quality, and he preferred well-worn short boots, which I remember were often in very poor condition. Besides a handkerchief, he carried in his pocket a silver cigarette case containing Persian cigarettes. He was meticulous about personal cleanliness.


At home he always slept on a mattress which was placed directly on the floor; he never used a bedstead. As a matter of fact, although the furnishings in my palaces might suggest otherwise, I really wish I could sleep in the same way.

On Reza Shah and DISCIPLINE:

He hurled himself unstintingly into the work of modernization, and he expected others to do the same. He totally reorganized the Government's administrative departments, and his spirit of discipline and selfless service began to pervade the whole structure. Often he would appear unhearalded at some Government office just at the opening hour. Woe betide any functionaries who arrived late!

Reza Shah's gift in seeing through people:

I have mentioned that he was one of the greatest mind-readers. He knew by the looks and attitudes of people exactly what they were thinking. He couldn't easily be fooled, and when he perceived hypocrisy of sham deference in his officials or courtiers he would laugh in their faces. He derived great, even if sardonic, amusement from that sort of thing. I think his scorn of pretence gave my country a tonic it badly needed, for court etiquette and een the exaggerated courtesies practised here by ordinary people had too often become hollow phrases and meaningless gestures. Form rather than substance was stressed. In Persia we had badly overworked our poet Saadi's proverb which says, "Well-meaning falsehoods are better than a truth which leads to a quarrel." My father was too blunt and honest to put up with that sort of thing, and it tickled him immensly to see others find out when they tried it.

More on his father:

Some five years ago I wrote a short appreciation of my father which was published in several languages. In that little book I expressed the view that what I had said might 'serve to make the Iranian nation and those who love this country - especially the younger generation - think about this great man who dedicated his life freely to the progress and welfare of his countrymen.' They should, I added, 'try to follow the example set by this man and learn the lesson of love for country and nation. It is every man's duty to prefer manliness and perseverance to fear and timidity; not to choose untruthfulness and meanness in place of truth and courage; to confront difficulties fearlessly and overcome them and take pleasure in doing so; to realize the shamefulness of idle habits and to regard work as his highest goal; to know what work...is the highest attribute of a man and gives him justifiable pride.'

In this chapter His Majesty also talks about his faith in God and describes various instances (crashes, assasination attempts etc) in which he believes he was saved by God or Imam "this & that". It is pretty incredible how he was able to survive those "difficult moments".

Below is a picture of Reza Shah the Great's "bed":

"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable" -J.F.K
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Postby Liberator » Sun Jan 30, 2005 3:48 pm

Chapter 4 pgs 59-81

Shahanshah Aryamehr talks about his education abroad, his communication with his father, and being restrained from enjoying himself with his companions on holidays whilst studying in Austria; his mentors were very strict with him.

On Mohammad Mossadegh:

Mossadegh repeatedly declared in public that I had saved his life. My father had ordered his arrest on charges of intruguing against the Government and acting as the tool of a foreign power.


My father had Mossadegh sent to an unsavoury prison in an isolated part of the country. Already old and in uncertain health , Mossadegh would probably not have survived long there. But I pleaded for him and only a few months later he was set free.
In the next chapter I shall describe how he used his freedom. Perhaps it is understandable that I often wonder whether I did right to plead Mossadegh's cause. But in the case of most other prisoners whom I persuaded my father to release, I am proud that I was able to help them.

On Iran-Germany relations in WWII:

...my father had deliberately fostered very close economic and cultural relations with Germany. By 1938, Germant had reached first place in Iran's foreign trade, with Russia (mostly because of her proximity) second; Germany supplied mainly industrial machinery and railway materials and equipment, and purchased chiefly raw wool and cotton. Many German engineers and other technicians were assisting in the development of our ports and railways, erecting and helping initially in the runing of factories which were mainly German-equipped, and even the transmitters at Tehran radio station had been installed by them.
Many German manufacturers and trading concerns had representatives in Iran. Some of our people were studying in Germany, several German professors were lecturing at the University of Tehran, and Germans headed the university's agricultural and veterinary college.


It is not surprising that my father had cultivated close economic ties with Germany. Her technicians and equipment were well and favourably known throughout the world, and she offered very good trade terms. Germany had no conspicuous record of imperialism in Iran; she had seldom interfered in our internal affairs, and she was opposed to the two big imperialist powers who had for so long plagued us. The Nazis made much of the common Aryanism of the two peoples. Persians were already accustomed to an authoritarian system, and somehow they didn't realize that Hitler, at least as much as Stalin, was denying the most basic human liberties.
Besides all this, my father urgently needed German technicians and imports of German equipment and materials in order to continue his national modernization programme and strengthen the armed forces.

Further on in this chapter the Shah talks about how the Allies invade the independent nation of Iran who had declared her neutrality in the war; the British from the south and Russians from the North, dividing the country into two spheres of influence in their quest to repell the German advance on Russia. In this invasion of our nation and its sovereignty, Persian troops were taken by surprise and there were considerable military and civilian casualties (the whole Persian fleet had been sunk by the British). The Shah explains that the Allied forces should have been more active in consultations with his father Reza Shah and that they could have proposed "an honourable diplomatic alliance with him" before violating Iran's independence. He describes the style the Allies invaded Iran as "Hitlerian style".

The British Government had since mid-1940 become increasingly apprehensive about such Nazi activities in Iran. They had gone so far as to give the Persian Govenment several friendly warnings, suggesting a reduction in the number of German technicians and other nationals. My father, however, pointed out the difficulty of replacing the technicians and certainty that the Germans would interpret such a move as a violation of Iran's neutrality. He added that his Government was fully able to cope with any improper acts the Germans might attempt.
In retrospect, I think the fact must be faces that, at least so far as I am aware, there was during the entire Second World War not a single effective case of sabotage on Iran's railways or in her oil industry

On Reza Shah's abdication:

It has sometimes been suggested that my father abdicated in order to save the throne for his son; but that is misleading. It is true that the care with which he had trained me showed that he had it ever in his mind for me to inherit the throne. But his abdication came chiefly because he was not the man to stay and see alien forces occupying the country and mixing in our affairs. In vivid language he told me that people had always known him as an independent monarch, respected and strong, representing only the interests of his country as he saw them. He said it was humanly impossible for him, who had such prestige and such a hold over his people, to act as the nominal ruler of an occupied country. He wanted to know how he, a reigning emperor, could take orders from, as he put it, 'some little British or Russian captain'. I should add that later, when I had assumed the throne, I refused to deal with any Allied representatives other than their heads of Government or their ambassadors.
The foreigners knew perfectly well that they couldn't work with my father, and he knew that he couldn't work with them. It is true that they put pressure upon him to abdicate and depart the country; but paradoxically enough their wish and his were in this matter identical. You might say that Reza Shah was exiled by mutual desire and consent.

On the new foreign policy (Shahanshah Aryamehr's reign):

In the treaty [Tripartite Treaty of Alliance 29 Jan 1942 btw Iran-Britain-Russia] the two Allies stated that the presence of their troops on our soil did not constitute a military occupation, although I must add that all Persians continued to call it so. The Allies promised to respect our territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence and to withdraw their forces within six months after the end of the war with the Axis. They also pledged themselves to ease Iran's economic difficulties arising from the war, and we in turn assured them of transit, communications, and other facilities needed to move supplies to Russia.
In keeping with our new foreign policy, we then severed diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan. On 9 September 1943, we declared war on Nazi Germany.
Internally, the Allied occupation couple dwith the sudden termination of my father's dictatorship brought all sorts of new dangers and tensions. The Allies seemed intent upon weakening my authority; apparently they though that they could then more easily dominate the country.
Their continual interference in our political life and affairs thoroughly disgusted me and my people.

The Shah continues to address various instances in which the Allies try to impose their rule on Iranian politics and how they created trouble in the country. The occupation lead to a great economical disaster, infaltion rose 400%!, creating tremendous difficulties for the ordinary people of Persia; meanwhile it made a small minority prosper on the misery of the people.

Rise of islamists:

Extremist religious elements, whom my father had pushed into the background, now reappeared; apparently some British political agents thought that the priests would help stop Communism.

Rise of communists:

The Soviet authorities fostered and largely financed a mushroom growth of Communist-oriented political parties and trade unions; the most dangerous group was the Tudeh or "Masses" party. The Russians refused to co-operate with our civil administrators in the northern provinces, which they completely dominated not only militarily but also politically and economically; the Soviet zone of occupation in fact became almost a seperate country and, as later events showed, the Soviets planned that much of it would remain so.

Shahanshah Aryamehrs personal feelings on the occupation:

During the occupation I was full of sorrow and had many sleepless nights. I opposed it both in principle and practice, for to me it semed a wholly needless infringement of our independence and sovereignty. On every side I saw the miseries and sufferings of our citizens brought on by the economic and other policies adopted, and at the same time I was revolted by the way in which some wealthy Persians became yet more bloated, in utter disregard of the welfare of their country.

"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable" -J.F.K
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Postby Liberator » Tue Feb 08, 2005 4:19 pm

Chapter 5 pgs 82-111

On Mossadegh:

What did Mossadegh lack that a true statesman needs? For one thing, his dearth of general knowledge always astounded me. Although he had studied abroad, he knew almost nothing about other countries. His special weakness seemed to be in economics. I am in no sense a professional economist, yet somehow I have managed to learn the more common facts and principles of national and international economics. As Shah I have dealt with countless officials of varying backgrounds and political persuasions; but in all candour I must say that rarely have I met anyone in a responsible position who matched Mossadegh's ignorance of the elementary principles of production, trade, and other economic factors. This was to me amazing. Since Mossadegh was not stupid, and indeed was something of a scholar, I can only account for his economic naivete by assuming that he was so wrapped up in his emotions that he had become incapable of objectively studying any economic question.

On Mossadegh's "negative equilibrium":

I remember one day Mossadegh told me to my face that my father was a traitor. I asked why. He said because my father had built the Trans-Iranian railway just to please the British, who wanted to use it to invade Russia. Then I asked if, according to his theory, my father should have built the railway in a different direction. His answer was that my father should have built no railways whatsoever, that Iran didn't need them, and that she was better off without them. Warming to this subject, Mossadegh went on to declare that before my father's time Iran had no railways or ports worth mentioning, you could scarcely call the roads by that name, and in Tehran people had to walk in the dirt and mud because there was no pavement. But at least said Mossadegh, Iran was independent. Pointing out the error in his logic, I reminded him that before my father's reign Iran was still under the yoke of capitulations. In that period half the country was dominated by the Russians and the other half by the British. Law enforcement was then so ineffective that even in early evening a wise man kept off the streets of Tehran, which were infested by thieves. In what way, I asked Mossadegh, were we then independent? He had no answer. But I could see that my arguments had not altered the conclusion to which his weird reasoning brought him.

On Mossadegh's policies:

....when Mossadegh later became Prime Minister, he stopped my programme of distributing royal lands to poverty-ridden peasants. This project was a practical means of helping the common people of my country to raise their standard of living, but Mossadegh couldn't tolerate such direct and positive action. The social welfare aspects of my programme seemed not to interest him at all. I think, too, he was jealous of the popularity of my land distribution scheme; and he, a wealthy landlord who was hanging on to his properties, felt ashamed by the precedent I established by dividing my holdings. Fortunately Mossadegh was overthrown before he could fritter away my lands.

On Mossadegh's national defence and domestic security policies:

Mossadegh's negativism extended also into the fields of national defence and domestic security. Repeatedly he told me that Iran, having suffered from the incursions of big powers, should in the future make no attempt to defend herself. He didn't propose to advertise this policy abroad; he merely wanted it understood within the country that if anybody invaded Iran we should offer no resistance.
He not only preached but also practised the same doctrine with regard to riots and civil disturbances at home. During his premiership in 1952 and 1953, when Tudeh and other mobs increasingly terrorized the capital and other of our leading cities, Mossadegh didn virtually nothing to stop them. During these outbreakshe usually posted tanks and well-armed troops throughout Tehran, but restrained the from effective action. Riots, looting, and pitched street battles went on under the very eyes of the security forces which, under Mossadegh's order, were reduced to the role of spectators. Eventually, many of Mossadegh's firmest supporters refused to countenance his apathetic handling of the spreading disorders. His own people realized that, intentionally or unwittingly, he was handing over the country to the Communists.

On Mossadegh's "supposed anti-foreign attitude":

At that time our Parliament was governed by a troublesome rule which required a two-thirds quorom for conducting any business and a three-fourths quorom for voting on legislation. Taking advantage of this rule, a minority bloc of some forty members regularly deadlocked Parliament by absenting themselves and preventing the necessary quorom. Mossadegh was in charge of these obstructionists.
Becoming thoroughly tired of such unpatriotic actions, I summoned Mossadegh and his minority group for an audience. I asked Mossadegh why he and his people were sabotaging the Government. To my astonishment he replied that it was because the Russians didn't approve of our then Prime Minister. I asked him why in these matters he shouls conduct himself just to please the Russians. Suppose, I said, it were some small power who objected to our Prime Minister - would Mossadegh oblige that power in the same way? Mossadegh had no answer.


Meantime American and British oil companies had been interested in obtaining additional oil rights in southern Iran, and the Soviet Union had demanded a concession in the north. Mossadegh considerably enhanced his prestige when, in 1944, Parliament passed his bill forbidding the Government to negotiate any oil concesion without Parliament's approval. The bill was a timely one, but it again illustrates Mossadegh's preoccupation with negative action.

The National Front group:

After the war Mossadegh busied himself with organizing a group of extreme so-called nationalists known as the National Front. He attracted a varied assortment of follwers, including some religious fanatics, students, bazaar merchants, and socialists. Superficially, these groups were bound together by a common hatred of foreigners and foreign influence. They readily co-operated on negative anti-foreign programmes; but later, when they could no longer evade the nation's need for some positive and constructive action, the coalition was doomed to fall apart.

Years leading to the nationalization of oil:

By ignoring our protests the company was systematically imperilling its huge investment in Iran; and the British Government, which might have prevailed upon the company to follow a saner course, failed to sway it. The company and the Government both fanned the fires of Iranian nationalism and strengthened Mossadegh's demagogic hold over the people. He and his National Front began to agitate in favour of nationalizing the oil industry.
Prime Minister Razmara opposed this, hoping for an amicable settlement. Mossadegh and his followers then launched wild demonstrations against the Prime Minister and the foreigners. On 7 March, 1951, a member of the Crusaders of Islam, one of the xenophobic groups supporting Mossadegh, foully murdered the Prime Minister while he was attending a ceremony in a mosque.
Only a few days later Parliament overwhelmingly passed a bill, which I fully endorsed, nationalizing the oil industry.

Mossadegh being appointed Prime Minister:

Mossadegh had already promised the people a new era of prosperity and plenty, to be financed by the oil revenues to which Iran was legitimately entitled. He shouted that he would wring £300,000- nearly $1 million - a day from the company. In fact, how could anyone be against Mossadegh? He would enrich everybody, he would fight the foreigner, he would secure our rights. No wonder students, intellectuals, people from all walks of life, flocked to his banner.
With such promises Mossadegh carried everything before him, and Mr Ala was forces out after less than two months in office. I appointed Mossadegh in his place; at that moment no one could stand against him.

Mossadegh's tenure:

Mossadegh might have shown equal firmness in seeking a constructive oil settlement, but instead he let the oil company call the tune. He spent his entire tenure of office fighting the company in an amateur fashion and regardless of the effects upon his country. When he was deposed he was no nearer a settlement maintaining our rights than when he had started. The United Nations Security Council, the World Bank, the Wourld Court, President Truman, President Eisenhower, and numerous other agencies and officials tried to help bring about an understanding, but to no avail. A prisoner of his advisers and even more of his own stubborn self, Mossadegh let his negative emotionalism rule out any chance of agreement. Instead of spending his time on reform and reconstruction, he devoted himself to bickering. We shall see later the lenghts he was ready to go in order to stay in power.

Mossadegh & Oil:

Mossadegh's second big miscalculation lay in his stubborn insistence that he knew how to market our oil with no help from the foreigners. Yet at that time we possessed not a single tanker, nor did we have even the beginnings of an international marketing organization.


Think of the economic miseries and the political perils that the people of my country would have been spared if Mossadegh had been willing to enter into rational negotiations. I still fondly imagine that, in spite of his disastrous stubborness, he at least had some desire to reach an agreement; but in the case of some of his advisers I am sceptical. I suspect that some of them fervently hoped there would be no settlement; for that would mean economic collapse and, in turn, the imposition of alien political control. That type of perverted nationalism I shall discuss in the next chapter.

Shahanshah Aryamehr includes this letter from Mossadegh sent from NY, and puts in question the "sincerity of his sentiments". Ultimately he leaves the reader to judge for himself in light of events that would happen afterwards:

New York, 21 October, 1951
To His Imperial Majesty, Tehran.
I received your Imperial Majesty's cable which was a great honour and a source of great joy to me. I always pray God to bless his Imperial Majesty with health, a long life, and ever-increasing success. I would like to state that all our successes wherever and in whatever connection they are obtained are due to your Imperial Majesty's attentions and assistance in always strengthening and guiding the Government. As your Imperial Majesty has already been informed by his Excellency the Minister of Court I am leaving for Philadelphia on Monday and for Washington on Tuesday morning wherefrom I shall report to your Imperial Majesty. I would like to ask permission to express once again my gratitude for the assistance and attentions of my noble Emperor.

Dr Mossadegh

13 July 1952 (Mossadegh is the Prime Minister of Iran at this time):

...he stated that he could not continue in that post unless he received extraordinary powers. Apprehensive because of rising Parliamentary and public opposition to his policies, he demanded authority to govern for six months without recourse to Parliament. He also declared that he must assume the post of Minister of War, a position which he hoped would enable him to undermine my power, provided in our Constitution, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces.
I refused these demands because I was certain that they would lead to further Communist infiltration. As you will see, I was to be proved right. On 17 July I accepted Mossadegh's resignation. Against my better judgement I appointed Ahmad Qavam, who had earlier served in the same post, as Prime Minsiter; some circles thought he could take a strong stand against the leftists.
Immidietely the Tudeh party, joined by Mossadegh's people launched riots and demonstrations. Mob rule prevailed, and Qavam's government seemed powerless to cope with it. Qavam in fact inflamed the situation by making a broadcast in which he sought to contradict the strong popular sentiment for oil nationalization.
President Eisenhower had now taken office, and he and Churchill made further proposals for settling the dispute in order to restore the flow of oil and oil revenues; but Mossadegh rejected these proposals as he had all previous ones.

Again it was clear that no one could stand against Mossadegh. On 22 July, 1952, the danger of civil war forced me to agree to his conditions and re-appoint him.


On 30 August, President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill sent a joint note to Mossadegh outlining a broad formula for settling the oil dispute. Mossadegh rejected the proposals, and on 22 October he broke off diplomatic relations with Britain.
During all this period, the great works at Abadan - both then and now the world's largest refinery - remained virtually idle, and Iran received no royalties. Mossadegh tried to sell oil to small foreign companies that were willing to run the risk of legal claims against them by the British for dealing in allegedly stolen property; but the total sales from these attempts brought in less income than one day's royalties in the period when the refinery had been running full blast.


...in January 1953, granted Mossadegh an extension of his emergency powers. I wanted to give him every opportunity to develop a constructive oil policy.
Unfortunately, from then on Mossadegh found these powers more and more convenient to his personal ambitions. He muzzled the Press and arrested newspaper editors. Because some of its members now had the courage to criticize him, Mossadegh reduced the National Assembly to impotence, not only by relying on his plenary powers but also by ordering his followers to stay away from the Assembly, thus depriving it of a quorum. Dissenting legislators were also threatened in their homes and on the streets by Mossadegh's hoodlums.
Mossadegh who had always preached about the danger of depreciating currency, did that very thing when he printed paper money of a nominal value of millions of dollars, without any increase in the gold or foreign exchange backing of the currency. He appointed military commanders personally loyal to him, and he allowed - many would say encouraged - the further infiltration of the army by Tudeh Communists. He extended martial law. He had Parliament set up a seven-man committee of his henchmen to study ways and means of curtailing my powers as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

On Mossadegh using the extraordinary powers given to him:

Mossadegh dissolved the Supreme Court. He suspended elections for the National Assembly. Further angered because some members of the latter body have been brave enough to oppose him, he announced a national referendum to decide if the current National Assembly should be dissolved.


Abd fir tge referendum Mossadegh, the great champion of free elections, arranged that those in favour of dissolution and those against it should vote in seperate plainly-marked booths! Everyone understood that if a man had the courage to vote against dissolution he would probably be beaten up by Mossadegh's toughs or by those of the Tudeh - actually the two groups by this time were almost indistinguishable.


Dissolution won by over 99 per cent of all votes cast. In one provincial ton where the entire population was about 3,000 people, 18,000 votes were announced as favouring dissolution. Both in that and in other towns, it seems that the dead had voted!
During all his years in Parliament, Mossadegh had posed as a champion of constitutional principles, representative government and due process of law. He had railed against the idea of martial law and had eulogized free elections and freedom of the press.
But now Mossadegh had in a few months abolished the Senate, dissolved the highest court of the land, and claimed a mandate from the people to eliminate the National Assembly. He had stiffled the Press, in effect abolished free elections, extended martial law, and tried his best to weaken my constitutional position. What had become of our hard-won Constitution of 1906?

Mossadegh suggesting the Shah leave the country for a while:

As the threat to the dynasty incrased, I also watched Mossadegh's progressive surrender to the agents of a foreign ideology; and my heart burned within me. In February 1953 he suggested that I temporarily leave the country. In order to give him a free hand to try out his policies, and to have a little respite from his intrigues, I agreed. He proposed that we should keep the plan a close secret, and said he would arrange for Fatemi, his Foreign Minister, personally to issue the necessary travel documents for me, my wife, and our entourage.
Amsingly enough, Mossadegh advised against our leaving by air; with more than usual acumen he remarked that crowds of people opposed to my departure might block the airport runway and prevent the plane from takin off. He proposed that instead we should travel incognito to the frontier and thence through Iraq to Beirut. I agreed.
But somehow the people had learned the secret of our planned departure. The ensuing mass demonstrations of loyalty to the Shah were so convincing and affecting that I decided to remain for the time being. The Tudeh party, no doubts in consultation with some of Mossadegh's followers, immidiately called for a united front against the monarchy, but this only seemed to rally the Persian people in support of me and of the position I symbolized.
In retrospect I realized that my decision to leave may have been a hasty one and indeed a big mistake on my part; but God had turned it into a stroke of good fortune.


By mid-1953 there was apparent a definite change in the temper of the nation. Many of Mossadegh's followers had deserted him. They saw that his anti-foreign policy had in actual practice become selective; the real objective was apparently to throw out the British but let in the Reds. The march of events forced upon the people the alarming realization that the country was sliding, not gradually but at breakneck speed, towards political and economic ruin.


Many religious leaders, students, and merchants, whom he had formerly numbered among his supporters, now turned against him.

On the overthrow of Mossadegh by Iranians:

Mossadegh had reinforced the armoured and other forces guarding his house in Tehran, but he had withdrawn most of the tanks which stood watch around my summer palace at Saadabad where Queen Soraya and I were then staying. In fact twelve U.S.-built medium tanks now guarded his house while the large Saadabad estate, protected by only four tanks, was plainly vulnerable to Tudeh attacks.


On 13 August, 1953, at Ramsar, I signed decrees dismissing Mossadegh as Prime Minister and naming General Fazlollah Zahedi in his place. To Colonel Nematollah Nassiry, commander of the Imperial Guard, I assigned the ticklish task of delivering the decrees.


...Colonel Nassiry first set out to deliver my order addressed to General Zahedi. I should record that General Zahedi had been a close associate of Mossadegh, and had in fact served for a while as his Minister of the Interior. Earlier he had been Chief of Police in Razmara's Government and had helped re-elect Mossadegh to Parliament. The General was known to be in the vicinity of Tehran, but his exact whereabouts were a closely guarded secret, divulged only to a handful of trusted associates. Actually, General Zahedi usually remained no more than a day or so at any given address. Because he had fearlessly criticized Mossadegh's methods, he had been obliged to seek sanctuary in the Parliament buildings, and later was forced into hiding. Under cover of darkness he would move on to a different place to escape capture or death.
Colonel Nassiry, aided by intermediaries, found General Zahedi and delivered my order to him. The General agreed to shoulder the job.
Colonel Nassiry now prepared to deliver my order to Mossadegh. First, on General Zahedi's order, Colonel Nassiry arrested three of Mossadegh's closest advisers from whom we gained some indications of Mossadegh's probable attitude. General Zahedi warned Colonel Nassiry if possible to deliver my order to Mossadegh personally, to forestall probable denial of its receipt. I had earlier instructed Colonel Nassiry to see that no harm came to Mossadegh.


Approaching Mossadegh's house, they found it surrounded by tanks and troops. These forces had been instructed not to allow troops of the Imperial Guard to approach the house in any circumstances. Ignoring this order, Colonel Nassiry and his two officers cooly walked past the muzzles of tank cannon right to Mossadegh's front door.


Recognizing Mossadegh's handwriting, he knew that the receipt was genuine. It was now about 1 A.M.
But before Colonel Nassiry could withdraw from the house, he was informed that General Riahi, the chief of the army's general staff under Mossadegh, had ordered him to be brought to his office a few blocks away. Colonel Nassiry though this would provide a good opportunity to inform General Riahi that the latter was out of a job.


As the door opened, General Riahi was in the act of removing an automatic pistol from his desk frawer and concealing it behing his back.


General Riahi accused Colonel Nassiry of acting in a barbaric manner by planning a coup d'ètat. Colonel Nassiry replied that he had merely been delivering my order to Mossadegh.


He told the Colonel that from that moment he was a prisoner, and shortly afterwards he was stripped of his uniform and put behind bars.


The next morning the army's Judge Advocate General, naturally a Mossadegh appointee, interrogated Colonel Nassiry. He charged that I had never issued an order dismissing Mossadegh, and that the Colonel had forged the document. Colonel Nassiry unfolded the smuggled newspaper. The interrogation ceased. [My note: The newspaper contained the order by His Imperial Majesty to dismiss Mossadegh]


The people, the ordinary people of my country - unarmed or carrying only sticks - had stormed the prison. The guards had ordered them to halt but they had pressed on. The guards then had opened fire, but still they came. An old lady and a number of young people had been shot dead and many others wounded. The guards had then fled.
In the prison courtyard Colonel Nassiry witnessed a scene of joy and exultation. Hundreds of prisoners, loyal to me and incarcerated by Mossadegh, had been released and the people were escorting them to freedom. When they spied General Batmangelich, whom I had appointed as General Riahi's successor but whom Mossadegh had imprisoned, they raised him on their shoulders and carried him in triumph down the street to his office. Thus the people expressed not only their loyalty to me but their joy at beeing freed of Tudeh and Mossadegh terrorism. Mossadegh's General Riahi had already fled.

The text continues to elaborate on how officers and ordinary people continued to free imprisoned officers. Armoured forces under Mossadegh opened fire on advancing crowds who didn't seem to care! There are many caualties and the Colonel narrates the story of a Mossadegh commander being disarmed by civilians as he was arguing with an officers asking for his weapon. The final strike is against Mossadegh's house which is literally a fortress surrounded by tanks and troops. Ordinary people, police, students, soldeirs, artisans...proceed the last blow against the last remaining forces of Mossadegh.

On bravery of ordinary citizens:

On the streets to the east, the populace were attacking Mossadegh's well-emplaced infantry, and on every brave woman was exhorting the people to advance. She cried out to them that she was only a woman, but if they were men they would charge the defenders. The attackers in spite of many casualties did push on until Mossadegh's infantry became demoralized.

Now that's what I call a Sheerzan-e Irani! Not a half-breed arabo-muslim God knows what under a chador (tent) attending friday night prayers at a mosque and sharing a husband with 4 other wives!!!!

On the success of the "revolution":

General Zahedi had originally planned to go to Isfahan to marshal forces there, and he had arranged for other loyal troops to advance towards Teheran from Kermanshah. But, first in our city of Resht and then in dozens of other towns and cities across the land, the ordinary people had already taken matters into their own hands.
So General Zahedi instead climbed aboard a tank, sent by the revolutionaries to the house where he was hidden, and started for the Teheran radio station. But again the populace preceded him. Aided by hundreds of taxi and bus drivers, a long column had already reached the outskirts of the city and had captured the station. Mossadegh's men taken by surprise, had little time to sabotage the transmitters before they fled. The equipment was soon repaired and over the radio the new Prime Minister declared the success of the revolution.
However, following a pre-arranged plan, the Queen and I had left Teheran before learning of the revolution's success. It had been decided weeks before that if Mossadegh should use force to resist his deposition, we would temporarily leave the country. I had decided upon this move because I believed that it would force Mossadegh and his henchmen to show their real allegiancies, and that thereby it would help crystallize Persian public opinion. This while I was absent from the scene we would in effect have a real referendum - one in which dead people would not vote.


On 22 August, 1953, three days after General Zahedi had assumed control, I returned to Teheran and to a heart-warming, tumultous welcome. I was greatly moved and touched by this expression of affection, a spontaneous ovation in such contrast to the regimented demonstrations in which Mossadegh and the Tudeh party had excelled.
The trials which followed illuminated some shadowy operations of the Mossadegh period. When Mossadegh became Minister of War in 1952, our armed forces contained about one hundred officers who were members of the Tudeh party. In the period of only about a year before his final downfall, this subversive group had increased to over six hundred; even the commander of the most trusted battalion of my Imperial Guard was a hard-core Communist. The testimony of these men revealed their plan to kill Mossadegh as soon as he had overthrown the Pahlavi dynasty, then to establush their own Communist regime following the pattern in other countries.


Aided by the Communists, Hossein Fatemi, Mossadegh's Foreign Minister, remained in hiding for seven months. When he was caught we had to give him strong police protection so that he would not be killed on the spot by the people. He was later tried and executed for treason. Mossadegh and the remaining members of his cabinet were also tried, and most of them imprisoned; all are now free. A number of Tudeh party members, including those who had tortured and murdered non-Communist citizens, were executed or imprisoned. I later extended clemency to those among the prisoners who had showed a clear desire to become loyal citizens. Such ex-Tudeh members are not permitted to hold regular government posts, but the Government does help them find other employment; for example a number of them are now working for our semi-autonomous Plan Organization.

On American and British involvement in the overthrow of Mossadegh:

The Free World felt deeply concerned over the crisis that developed in my country prior to the fall of Mossadegh and his Tudeh allies. I have, therefore, sometimes been asked if America or Britain helped finance the movement that overthrew Mossadegh. Of course it was well known that a foreign power helped establish the Tudeh party, and that from the beginning it was aided with foreign funds; so it was easy to believe that those who were opposed to the Tudeh and to Mossadegh were also subsidized. Rumours flow unusually freely in my country, and one had it that ordinary people who rose against Mossadegh in some instances received American dollars or (according to another version) British pounds for their help.
Although I was abroad at the climax of the uprising, I was in constant touch with the situation during those days, and of course lived with it before and after my short absence. I do not deny that payments could in some cases conceivably have been made. I frankly have no firm evidence either way. But I think this is certainly true: it takes much more than money to impel people to do what Iran's loyal citizens did during those days. In overturning Mossadegh and the Tudeh, they staged a revolution that was inspired by indigenous nationalism. I have told how many of them advanced unarmed against the fire of tanks and machine-guns. Women and children as well as men gave up their lives in that way. I doubt if those brave people expected or received payment for their patriotism. I credit them with ideals of a nobler sort.
Besides, it always amazed me that some who talked most loudly about alleged foreign payments seemed to have no objection to them when they came from Communist sources. What kind of hypocrisy is that? How many are fooled by it?
When Prime Minister Zahedi took office, he immediately set about putting Iran's house in order. The Government was by this time virtually bankrupt. In September 1953 President Eisenhower announced an immediate allocaton of $45 million in emergency economic aid (as distinguished from Point Four help) to make up deficits in our Government's budget. Economic aid to support the budget averaged about $5 million a month for the three years following Mossadegh's fall.

Prime Minister Zahedi dealing with nation's leftover problems from Mossadegh time in office:

Iran's budgetary plight arose mainly, of course, from the continued stagnation of the oil industry under Mossadegh. Prime Minister Zahedi, moving to get the oil flowing again, first re-established diplomatic relations with Great Britain; some extremists criticized this move. Negotiations were then opened for the creation of an international consortium which would take the place of the all-British company. American, British, French, and Dutch companies eventually joined together for this purpose, and in September 1954, a final agreement was drawn up. In the following month Parliament ratified the agreement, I approved it, and tankers began to load at the ports serving the great refinery at Abadan. With the revenue from oil sales, plus the generous American help I mentioned, Iran's development programme was resumed.


Yet in a strange way Mossadegh filled a temporary need. In my country after the Second World War, circumstances almost seemed to demand a person of Mossadegh's irrational, emotional temperament. After the chaos of the war and domination by foreigners in our midst, we in Iran felt a resurgence of nationalistic fervour. We were in the irrational phase, and you could discern in Iran during those years the same immature nationalism to be seen elsewhere today. In fact, if you want to understand the real meaning of the new wave of nationalism that is now sweeping over some countries you can do no better than to look at Iran in Mossadegh's time.
Mossadegh showed no diffidence about accepting the role that events thrust upon him. As Prime Minister he raved, he ranted, he wept, he fainted, he wore his famous pyjamas at public meetings. On the slightest provocation he feigned illness and took to his bed.
I remember that on one occasion Mossadegh swooned in the midst of a speech to our Parliament. When a hastily summoned doctor started to loosen his clothes, Mossadegh instantly revived enough to clap his hand over his wallet. The old hypocrite had not been unconscious at all; he was merely pretending in the hope of impressing his audience.
I think this incident, observed by many, illustrates cardinal characteristics - namely, his insincerity. I am sorry to have to say that Mossadegh did not merit the confidence of those who thought he was honest; for gross insincerity in a man deprives him of any right to be called honest in the broader sense of that term. Those who knew him at close range, as I did, will long remember Mossadegh with pity as somebody who lacked integrity as well as manliness and statesmanship. His three main charactersitics were his negativism, his hyocrisy, and his egotism.
In the beginning he had served his country well. In his negative way he had crystallized our people's anti-foreign sentiments; with his own interests at heart he had jumped on the bandwagon of xenophobia. Oddly enough, his real usefulness to the country ended with his appointment as Prime Minister.


Mossadegh, let us hope unintentionally, betrayed the common people of Iran by promising them a better deal and then sabotaging his own promises.


While Mossadegh was Prime Minister, his colleagues in other oil-producing countries were using oil to finance national development. Mossadegh did nothing. His own obtuse stubborness ( for which he was known long before he came to power), his own pshychological need to be forever in the limelight, prevailed at the expense of his country and of those who sought to serve it loyally.
When we later reached an oil settlement, we did it strictly within the terms of the nationalization law. Some of Mossadegh's apologists went out of their way to overlook that point. We reached agreement under the terms of the same law that was already in force when Mossadegh came to power. Later we went on to make other contracts that opened a whole new era in the relations between oil-producing and oil-consuming countries.


Possession of power tests a man. Some men rise to its moral challenge and become greater; others become smaller. Tested by the results of his possession of power, Mossadegh became a very small man indeed.
Every country makes mistakes. If the Mossadegh experiment taught us how not to run a country, perhaps in the long run it will have proved worth while. On 19 August each year, my country celebrates Nation Day, commemorating the fall of Mossadegh and the routing of alien forces that came within a hair's breadth of extinguishing our independence. I hope we never forget its significance.

Picture below is of Mossadegh with a Soviet official if i'm not mistaken:


Dr Yazdi, Tudeh Party leader; arrested by Imperial troops in 1953 after the fall of Mossadegh


Not sure if this is General Batmangelich:


Mossadegh kissing Queen Soraya's hand:


Mossadegh during his trial. Sitting next to his legal aide Colonel Shahgholi:

"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable" -J.F.K
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Postby Liberator » Sat Feb 19, 2005 4:53 pm

Chapter 6 pgs 111-131

Persian-British relations:

Paradoxically enough it was under Mossadegh, who so constantly delivered tirades against foreigners, that the British interests gained almost unprecedented influence inside Iran. This was because his negative policies allowed the British to call the tune. From first to last during his premiership, Mossadegh's almost every act represented an emotional response to some British move in the continuing oil crisis. He was like an unskilled boxer who, falling into panic, lashes out blindly at his opponent and never seizes the intiative which will alone enable him to win. Intentionally or not, the British showed Mossadegh what to do by the simple process of letting him react emotionally to whatever they did.
But after the exposure of Mossadegh's policies and his fall from power, the oil agreement of 1954 ushered in a new era in Persian-British relations. The agreement greatly increased the scale of payments to Iran; but its most important result was the termination, once and for all, of the British monopolistic hold over Iran's oil industry. No longer could a giant private corporation, or Government behing it, dominate a large sector of our economy. The agreement symbolized the fact that Persia and Britain now dealt with each other on the basis of full equality, and paved the way for the neighbourly relations which have existed between the two countries ever since. Presently-unforeseen circumstances might again bring tension between my country and Britain, but given calm and wise statesmanship in the spirit of equality, I see no reason why that should happen.

Soviet Union meddling in Iranian national affaires:

The communists are generally quick to recognize, when their policies are unprofitable. Lenin, and after him Stalin, apparently concluded that the RUssian-sponsored Soviet Republic of Gilan had indeed been an amateur experiment. The Russians thought that they could serve their own interests much better through a treaty of friendship, and as long as my father was in power, they made no further over attempt to nibble away pieces of our territory.
In fact it was not until twenty-five years later that they tried again. During the Second World War, Russia again infiltrated Iran. Then, following her success in building up the Tudeh party, she became very confident of her ability to subvert our people. In 1945 she sponsoredthe formation of not one but two puppet governments within my country. One of these regimes was known as the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, while the other was styled the Autonomous Government of Azerbajian. The former lay in western Iran in an area occupied chiefly by Kurdish tribesmen, while the latter included mainly our north-western province of Azerbaijan, adjacent to the Russian border. Both regimes were proclaimed in December of 1945. Each collapsed after about a year. But that year was one of the most critical in our recent history, and it taught us a great deal about the methods of the Communists.


In August 1945 the Tudeh party had forcibly taken over several government buildings in Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan. Our troops stationed there were confined to their barracks by the Russian army,and when we sent relief forces from Teheran to quell the uprising, the Russians stopped them before Ghazvin, some 300 miles from Tabriz. The Tudeh party in Azerbaijan was now reorganized and given the innocuous name of the Democratic party. By November the Democrats completely controlled the province. They sat up a legislative assembly which on 12 December proclaimed the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. For Prime Minister of the "autonomous" republic the assembly chose Jafar Pishevari, a Communist agent who had spent many years in the Soviet Union. With the aid of Russian arms, equipment and personnel, he proceeded to establish a police state that embarked on a reign of terror.

Mohammad Reza Shah orders armies to crush the enemies:

At this juncture I followed my conscience. I ordered my troops to Azerbajian to put down the rebellion once and for all. At the same time I personally flew over the rebel positions to ascertain their strength. The Russians now completely deserted their puppets, and the rebel government collapsed as our forces triumphantly entered Tabriz on 15 December 1946. The insurgent leaders fled to Russia. It was the ordinary people of Tabriz and Rezaieh - always known in our history as freedom-loving cities - who really led in the routing of the puppet government. Their inhabitants liquidated many of the Communist soldiers, and as a matter of fact our army had to intervene to keep the people from exterminating the Communist prisoners.
Concurrently our forces, assisted by Kurdish tribesmen and the local population, overthrew the comapnion Kurdish puppet regime.

The "Cold War" during Shahanshah Aryamehr's reign:

I think historians of the future will say that the Col War really began in Iran.


The local Communists bided their time. They were waiting for any new sign of instability and potential chaos which could be exploited to their advantage. Their patience was rewarded. They found their golden opportunity under Mossadegh.


Stalin died on 4 March, 1953, and Mossadegh fell on 19 August of that same year. Stalin's death marked the beginning of a new era in Russia, and Mossadegh's elimination heralded the dawn of a new day in Iran. As I have said, relations with the Soviet Union soon began to improve. Russian propagandists declined to offer any further support to the discredited Tudeh party, and Russia showed every inclination to co-operate with me and with my new Government.

The Russians were to resume their meddling in Iranian affaires shortly afterwards....

Mohammad Reza Shah's "Positive Nationalism":

Then how may one degine positivve nationalism and what kind of action does it sugges? Positive nationalism, as I conceive it, implies a policy of maximum political and economic independence consistent with the interests of one's country. On the other hand, it does not mean non-alignment or sitting on the fence. It means that we make any agreements which is in our own interest, regardless of the wishes or policies of others. We are not intimidated by anybody who tries to tell us whom we should have for four our friends, and we make no alliances merely for the sake of alliances or of vague principles, but only in support of our self-interest. We cultivate the friendship of all, and are prepared to take advantage of every country's technical skills if to do so does not prejudice our interests or our independence. This gives us great freedom of action - much more than that enjoyed by any dogma-ridden state. At the same time we resolutely stand for the ideals and principles of the United Nations.
We place no reliance on supine passive neutrality; we are outspokenly friends to our friends, and we count on them to be friends to us. If some countries occasionally irritate, or threaten us, we nevertheless refuse to become negative in our thinking or our action towards them. We are not like the owl hooting among the ruins; by that I mean we refuse to shout abuse from the housetops (or over the international radio) and condemn everybody and meanwhile remain miserable, poor, and weak. On the contrary, we daily become stronger and more prosperous, we are building a new country, and at the same time we are maintaining the truest nationalist sentiments.


Nationalism, like imperialism is a tricky notion. In its true form, nationalism can lead a country to greatness. For example, it is this spirit which unquestionably underlies much of America's notable progess, and my father's amazing achievements were due in no small degree to his having given expression to the pure spirit of nationalism instinctive to our people.
On the other hand the same spirit, cleverly used by local traitors or by an outside power, leads to imperialist infiltration and subversion and is the prelude to national suicide. When Mossadegh and his followers cried like women and indulged in hysterical tirades against the British, many sincerely thought at first that this was nationalism. But as time went by, patriots realized that Mossadegh was in fact opening wide the door for imperialist subversion. His negative policies led straight to the sort of political and economic chaos which foreign agents found ideal for their purposes. Whereas my father had eradicated imperialism, Mossadegh provided it with an ideal spawning ground of which it was not slow to take advantage.
There is nothing more dangerous for a man or for a nation than to be a prisoner of one's personal sentiments and a captive of one's egotism. After all, I had more plausable personal grounds than Mossadegh for being angry with the British. Had they not been instrumental in getting rid of my father? Had they not helped welcome the Russians into my country during the Second World War? While Mossadegh stewed in his emotions, I tried to think of the larger national interest. I have already explained that Mossadegh's negative nationalism not only provided the Communists with their ideal opportunity but paradoxically, allowed the British more influence over Iran's national policies than ever before.


In Iranian bookshops and in daily Press you can find material that is sharply critical of some of the Government's policies. We deliberately allow such things to circulate, realizing as we do that it is in the interest of democratic self-expression and self-criticism. In Persia one can likewise attend university and public lectures in which direct criticisms are made of the Government. Occasionally you will hear one of my countrymen proclaim that there is "no freedom" in Iran, but there is significance in the fact that he is at liberty to say such things without fear of punishment. I think impartial observers agree that in our universities we have remarkable academic freedom.

"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable" -J.F.K
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Postby Liberator » Fri Mar 04, 2005 2:40 pm

Chapter 7 Pgs 132-160


My father was never satisfied with the pace of modernization, and neither am I. But under the Second Seven-Year Plan we are making progress. Some of our most basic advances remain largely unseen, because they consist of economic and engineering plans carefully drawn up with the help of foreign experts. In other cases the physical construction of projects is under way or has been completed. It is often forgotten that the wise planning of a project may take fully as long as its material realization in steel and concrete, machinery and equipment.
In these last few pages I have given some fragments of my philosophy of nation-building. But this is only the beginning of what I have to say on this subject. And here I want to be very frank.


An Oriental court, backed by thousands of years of tradition, naturally abounds in romance and pegeantry. But if you want to know me, you must know my convictions as a man and head of state in this seething part of the world. And the plain truth is that I derive my chief satisfactions from grappling with complex economic and other problems. Myself as Shah cannot be separated from myself as a man fervently interested in economic development, agricultural reform, and educational advance.
No man in my position could be unconcious of the temptations of power, but luckily I find my main motivations and rasion d'ètre elsewhere. To me there is nothing drab about, let us say, an intricate question expanding agricultural productivity. To me it comes absorbingly alive just because even a slight advance in solving it can mean so much to thousands of ordinary citizens here in this part of the world.
I won't go so far as the Englishman who remarked that he would rather share a bed with a copy of The Economist than with a woman. But I do find most of my chief rewards in wrestling with difficult problems and issues that, I suppose, might bore some people to extinction. Indeed, I notice that my appetite is whetted by any reasonably coherent account of the trials and rewards of nation-building. I hope that my readers feel the same.

Few economic and social developments under the Imperial Government of Iran (I thoroughly enjoyed reading this part!!! The country was moving forward at an amazing speed until it came to a halt in 1979 and started going BACKWARDS!) :

First Month
A new school for the blind was opened. Telephone communications were inaugurated to three towns in southern Iran. I distributed thirtyfour of my villages to small farmers, each of whom received a title deed.
Mobile courts were established in Azerbajian. An anti-tuberculosis centre was opened in the city of Resht. A new deep well was completed in southern Teheran.
I officialy opened Iran's new bureau of standards. Radio-telephone communications were inaugurated between Iran and Italy. Drilling began in the Persian Gulf on Iran's first off-shore oil well.
Government land was given to 582 civil servants in Abadan for building houses. The Industrial and Mineral Development Bank of Iran was officialy established. A new school was opened in the Yezd area. A new factory in Karaj began turning out concrete sleepers of the railways.
Construction was completed on anti-tuberculosis clinics in cities of Meshed, Isfahan, and Babol. In Isfahan a textile industry school was officialy opened and began admitting students.

Second Month
On the outskirts of Teheran I dedicated a newly-completed orphanage for 2,000 children. One of my sisters opened a clinic and a canteen.
On the occasion of my birthday, twenty-eight new schools were opened in various parts of the country. New power stations went into operations in fifteen provincial towns. Street-paving was completed in seven towns.
Installation of electric signals was finished at twelve railway stations in south-central Iran. A mechanized agriculture centre was opened in the province of Kurdistan. Work started on a gas pipeline from of the southern oil fields to Shiraz, to serve both the city and the new fertilizer factory under construction there. In Khorasan province construction was finished on a fuel-oil depot, and pumping was started to fill the tanks. A clinic was finished in one town and a sanatorium in another. Construction began on the Shahnaz dam, named after my daughter.

Third Month
A women's wing was opened at a hospital in Kurdistan province, and a new dental clinic started operations there. Wireless telephone communications were established between the cities of Fars and Isfahan. Enlargements were completed at oil storage depots at five different cities and towns. A large irrigation canal was dedicated. Five elementary schools and nine techincal and vocational schools were opened in various towns and cities, and construction was finished on five other elementary schools. A new sugar factory, our first privately-owned one, started experimental producation. The Government finished building 250 rural houses. One of our new 33,000-ton oil tankers, completed her maiden voyage from Europe and loaded her first cargo of oil.
A factory for making olive and sesame oil went into production. I cut the ribbon at the newly-completed extensions to a hospital in Teheran.
Output at one of our oil fields was doubled as three new wells went into production, and engineers struck oil at another field. A bread factory and two new telephone exchanges were opened in Teheran. A diversion tunnel was finished at the Sefid Roud dam. Ten experimental deep irrigation wells were drilled. A new hospital, named after Queen Farah, was opened.


A few miles west of Teheran, in as beutiful a setting as a university, is the Government-owned Razi Institute, named after one of our great scientists who died in A.D. 1209. Here large quantities of vaccines and other biological research and testing is carried on, and one of the best medical libraries in Iran is maintained. In a typical year the institute manufactures about forty million doses for treating a wide variety of diseases. Our Government-affiliated Pasteur Institute - which, with the Razi Institute, was established in my father's time - carries on a somewhat similar programme. The two organizations are known for their original researhc and their high scientific standards, and together they make Iran almost self-sufficient in biologicals.









"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable" -J.F.K
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Postby Liberator » Mon May 02, 2005 8:08 am

Hamihanane aziz, I won't be able to extract as many passages as I want from HM's book due to the limited time that I have. I hope you decide to purchase this book and read the vision that our beloved King had for his country and people.


Chapter 8 Pgs 161-194

On progress:

But it remained for my father to set up the first efficient system of public administration that Iran had enjoyed for centuries. He extended unified control over the entire country, abolishing the municipal governorships and doing away with the arbitrary powers of the provincial governors-general. He centralized tax collection and forbade the old system of farming out taxes. He organized the ministries in the same likness. He discharged and punished corrupt officials, and he sent honest ones (as well as hundreds of students who aspired to the public service) abroad for training. Perhaps most important, he infused the entire public service with a sense of nation-building and of dynamic economic and social development.
I have already described the amazing economic and social progress Reza Shah achieved. He freed my country from a centuries-old lethargy. He laid the indispensable foundations for the forward steps that my people, my Government, and I are taking now.
My own thinking about democracy represents a further development of my father's philosophy. For example, largely because of the rapid spread of education in my country, I can give more emphasis to representative government than he did. Also I place much stress upon harnessing the fruits of modern science, which has not only shown new ways for helping ordinary people everywhere, but at the same time has given them the desire for its benefits.

What about political democracy in Persia? Our Constitution is patterned after that of Belgium. It provides for constitutional government within the framework of our monarchial tradition. The Constitution of today consists of the original document of 1906 plus a number of amendments, the lates passed in 1957.

The Constitution provides for a Parliament composed of a National Assembly or lower house and a Senate or upper house. The National Assembly has 200 members called deputies (there is provision for more as our population increases), who sit for four-year terms; among them are a special deputy elected by the Jewish community, another by the Zoroastrians, another by the Assyrians, and two by the Armenians. I am proud that as a symbol of tolerance these minority groups actually enjoy proportionately more representation that does our population at large. The National Assembly's deputies are elected from the seventy-eight constituencies into which the entire country is divided. All male citizens twenty-one years of age or over may vote, with certain exceptions such as members of the royal family, military personnel, and convicted criminals. Of course a great many men do not vote, but with the spread of civic and other education the number of voters is steadily increasing.
The Senate consists of sixty members, half representating Teheran and half of the provinces. I nominate half of each group and the others are elected. Senators are initially elected or appointed for six years, but after the first three years half the members are elminated by drawing lots. Replacements are then either elected or appointed.
All bills must be appoved by both houses of Parliament, except for those dealing with budgetary and tax matters, which are the province of the National Assembly. For any bill to become law, it must have my signature. Under the Constitution I have the power of vetoing financial bills by sending them back to the National Assembly for revision, but my veto can be over-ridden, for if three-quarters of the members present vote for passage of a returned bill, I am obliged to sign it. The Constitution also gives me power to dissolve either or both houses of Parliament; but I must state my reason for doing so (the Constitution says I may not give the same reason twice), and I must immidiately call for fresh elections so that the new chamber or chambers may convene within the space of three months.

Iran's judicial system is inspired chiefly by that of France. Before my father's time, the priests held almost all legal functions in theirown hands. Reza Shah completely revolutionized Iran's concept of jurisprudence, and some experts maintain that our Westernization programme has taken longer and faster steps in the legal field than any other. Relieving the priests of nearly all their judicial powers, my father issued modern civil, criminal, and commercial codes, and codes of civil and criminal procedure. He also established a complete hierarchy of courts. Today the lowest general court is the justice of the peace in small towns and groups of villages, with jurisdiction over all petty cases and misdemeanours. In larger towns the district court is the court of first instance. Then come the courts of appeal, or courts of second instance, which are located in the larger cities. At the top is the Court of Cassation or Supreme Court, which (except for rare cases involving the impeachment of ministers) hears only appeal cases. There are also special administrative, commercial, and military courts.
Our Constitution also gives the Crown a number of prerogatives in addition to the dissolution and veto powers already mentioned. As King I appoint the Prime Minister. I also appoint the other ministers, usually with his advice; likewise I sign the decress appointing governors-general, higher judges, ambassadors, military officers, and certain other officials. I serve as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, both declaring war and concluding peace. I foster the country's general development along the lines described in this book. Perhaps most important, as King I promote Persia's unity and solidarity. It was twenty-five hundred years ago that Cyrus the Great established the first unified Persian Nation and Empire, and ever since then the monarchy has helped to bind us together.




"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable" -J.F.K
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